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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
INTRODUCTION 
Since President Hafiz al-Asad's seizure of power in 1970, Syria has experienced numerous 
changes both in its domestic and regional environment, however, over time Syrian foreign 
policy decision-making has remained consistent. It is the purpose of this study to examine 
the determinants of Syrian foreign policy between November 1970 and July 1994. 
This dissertation will operate from the assumption that Syrian foreign policy has been 
determined by two main factors and, therefore, will be approached from two perspectives: 
(i) the struggle against Israel on behalf of Arab nationalist goals and (ii) the need to 
preserve internal regime legitimacy. The hypothesis of this dissertation asserts that these 
two aspects have been compatible and were inextricably interlinked between 1970 and 
1990. During this period the pursuit of a consistent Arab nationalist foreign policy had 
become a basic legitimising component for the regime. However, this paper also intends to 
illustrate that after the emergence of the New World Order and the Kuwait crisis of 1990, 
the external environment has placed new constraints upon the definition of Arab 
nationalist goals enforcing a reduction in the Arab nationalist agenda. Consequently, the 
author wil l suggest that the basis of internal legitimacy was altered correspondingly, 
beginning to replace legitimacy based upon consistent Arab nationalist policies with 
legitimacy based upon the purveyance of economic prosperity. 
For the purpose of this paper, the definition of pan-Arabism will be restricted to the Arab-
Israeli conflict since with the reluctant acceptance of the regional subsystem of states by 
nearly all Arab leaders and parties, this conflict has become the main concern of Arab 
nationalism at the expense of the earlier drive for the unification of the Arab states. Whilst 
the notion exists beyond this interpretation, there is not sufficient space in this paper to 
develop the idea further. . ^ Q | \ 
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Throughout the course of this paper, it is the intention of the author to denote the 
emergence of a gradual shift in regime legitimacy from Arab nationalism to legitimacy 
through the provision of economic prosperity. This change can be conceptualised in terms 
of the basis of legitimacy as defined by Max Weber's typology1, which wil l itself be 
modified and further elaborated for the purposes of this study. When Asad assumed power 
in 1970, the legitimacy of the regime owed its origins to an ideological thrust. This paper 
intends to suggest that an evolution has taken place from neo-patrimonial/ideological 
legitimacy in the 1970s and 1980s to a combination of neo-patrimonial/ideological 
legitimacy and legal/rational legitimacy after the Gulf War. Asad in this way utilises the 
many instruments of legitimation at his disposal. By varying the combinations of 
legitimacy, he has succeeded in maintaining a reservoir of support from his original 
consistency, whilst successfully engaging the diffuse support of the business community. 
To facilitate the presentation of this paper, I have divided it into four principle sections. It 
should be noted that each section will provide an overview based on secondary sources as 
well as primary sources collected on a study-trip to Syria in June 1994. 
Before assessing the importance of regime legitimacy and its relationship with a consistent 
Syrian foreign policy, it is necessary to determine which approaches will be utilised and 
how the study will be considered. Therefore, a theoretical framework is needed and a brief 
look at the discipline of international relations required. Chapter one will provide a 
theoretical framework for the proposed area of this study. 
Chapter two will concentrate upon the domestic aspect of this study, covering the period 
from 1970 to the Gulf War. When President Asad gained power in 1970, he inherited a 
constituency embued with ideological imperatives. Chapter two will suggest that Asad 
attempted to broaden his support base partly in order to redefine Arab nationalist goals. 
This would provide sufficient room for domestic manoeuvering, whilst delivering an 
ability to pursue a rational foreign policy. Operating through a rationale based on political 
incentive, namely the need for regime survival; regime stability; and the pursuit of 
1 WEBER, M., The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, London, William Hodge and 
Company Limited, 1947. 
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autonomy, Asad sought to increase his regional standing. 
Chapter two will explore how Asad transformed his state from a reformist/revolutionary 
state to a more bourgeois/bureaucratic one through the introduction of economic and 
political liberalisation. Whilst this is not a study dedicated to economic and political 
liberalisation, I have found its applicability essential in attempting to analyse Asad's 
political orientations. After seizing power, Asad ensured that the Ba'th party disrupted 
Syria's "natural" civil society and replaced it with a state dependent one. Moreover, Asad 
was largely responsible for incorporating and subduing the public sector elements whilst 
reactivating various components of the bourgeoisie. A mixture of statist policies and 
incremental liberalisation measures has produced a state that can be broadly categorised as 
"Bonapartist" in form. The main aim of Asad's internal strategy was to achieve autonomy 
from domestic constraints and interests in order to consolidate the Syrian state. This would 
allow him to conduct a rational foreign policy in the struggle with Israel. 
Chapter three will focus upon the external policies of the Asad regime, running from 1970 
to the Gulf conflict of August 1990. This Chapter will indicate that the defeat of 1967, the 
death of Nasser and the arrival of Hafiz al-Asad marked a shift away from rejectionist 
strategies and a move towards pragmatism. Asad's realist strategies helped to redefine the 
concept of pan-Arabism and sought to shape an environment in which an honourable 
peace settlement according to UN resolution 242 could be achieved. 
It is apparent from 1970 that Syria's foreign policy was compatible and consistent with its 
new conception of pan-Arab aspirations. However, Hafiz al-Asad has displayed flexibility 
in pursuing these ambitions. His strategy and use of tactics have sometimes appeared to be 
inconsistent with his pan-Arab objectives, and this has frequently placed Syria within a 
conflictual scenario with the other Arab states and challenged the regime's legitimacy 
within Syria. It is therefore essential to distinguish between Syria's policy objectives and 
the strategy employed to achieve them; the former remained consistent, whilst the latter 
was marked by maximum flexibility. 
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Chapter three will illustrate how the adoption of tactics seemingly at odds with Arab 
nationalism actually served Asad's pursuit of Arab nationalist goals. Asad's consistency in 
the pursuit of his pragmatic, nationalist goals was necessary to maintain the regime's 
ideological legitimacy. The flexibility acquired by Asad in pursuing his policy objectives 
was made possible through the relative autonomy he enjoyed. 
Chapter four will examine the impact of the changing international environment, especially 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War, upon Syrian foreign policy. The author 
of this paper intends to provide an explanation of how the New World Order has gradually 
diminished the prospect of fulfilling the Arab nationalist goals. The Oslo agreement has 
contributed to the further division of Arab solidarity and challenged the prospects for 
comprehensive peace. Chapter four will indicate that Asad, in order to maintain his 
legitimacy, had to start shifting the basis of regime legitimacy away from Arab 
nationalism to legitimacy based upon the alleviation of liberal, economic and material 
irryroverishment. The Oslo agreement has provided Asad with an opportunity to reach an 
honourable peace, but one that is no longer defined by a strict adherance to the 
comprehensive solution. Although the regime officially continues to strive for a 
comprehensive peace, a separate peace settlement with Israel over the Golan would no 
longer damage regime legitimacy as Asad is considered to be a tough negotiator who has 
been consistent for years and is now struggling to get the best possible deal. 
The conclusion will assimilate the threads of this thesis. It will provide an overview of 
how the documentation on Syria is compatible with the theoretical framework provided by 
this dissertation. 
CHAPTER 1 : THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
If one is to address the relationship between regime legitimacy and foreign policy, it is 
essential to provide a working definition of legitimacy. This will form the first part of my 
theoretical framework. In the remaining sectors of this chapter, three models for 
understanding or explaining foreign policy will be presented and challenged: (i) the 
rational actor model, (ii) the domestic politics model, and (iii) omnibalancing. The first 
two models are extreme approaches; omnibalancing provides a compromise between the 
two extremes. It is the intention of the author to introduce an improved fourth model 
which is the only model to adequately account for the link between consistency in foreign 
policy and regime legitimacy in Syria. 
1.1 D E S C R I P T I O N AND DEFINITION O F L E G I T I M A C Y 
Weber distinguished three types of legitimacy: (i) legal/rational authority2, (ii) charismatic 
authority3, and (iii) traditional authority4. In this paper, the following modified version of 
Weber's legitimacy typology will be utilised in order to understand legitimacy in the 
Syrian case: (i) legal/rational legitimacy, (ii) ideological legitimacy, and (iii) neo-
patrimonial legitimacy. It should be noted that in Syria since 1970, no category by itself 
has proved to be sufficient in providing a basis to consolidate the regime. Regime 
legitimacy has always derived from a combination of two or three of these legitimacy 
types. In the following chapters, this study intends to demonstrate how Asad has combined 
and altered the legitimacy mix on which his regime is based parallel to developments in 
foreign policy. 
2 WEBER, M., o c , , p. 302-312. 
3 WEBER, M., o c . , p. 329-333. 
4 WEBER, M., o c ^ p. 313-328. 
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1.1.1 Legal/rational legitimacy 
Legal/rational legitimacy refers to a situation where the ruler is perceived as legitimate 
because he pursues rational policies or goals, accepts legal procedures, and works through 
institutions and laws. Rationality can be manifest in two crucial aspects of policymaking. 
Firstly, governing can be rational essentially in the sense of creating an environment in 
which economic rationality is fostered and economic development can take place. 
According to Weber rational economic policies consist of capitalist development. 
Secondly, legitimacy from rationality can be obtained from the recognition of the public 
opinion that the political elite pursues realistic and attainable foreign policy goals and is 
effective in achieving such goals. 
Although legal/rational legitimacy in Syria is still is weak, particularly in its legal 
dimension, one has to take into account the possibility of its gradual growth. Indeed, the 
civil service, the military, to the significant extent they operate according to the 
legal/rational norms of bureaucratic organisation have increasingly added rationality to 
governmental authority. As legal/rational legitimacy increases, the need to protect the 
economic base of the regime has also pushed it towards pursuit of more rational economic 
policies. Moreover, the elite has to respond to the fact that in the rational pursuit of goals 
such as economic development, public opinion increasingly judges the legitimacy of the 
regime on how well they perform.5 In the meanwhile, however, authority of the Syrian 
regime largely remains dependent upon ideological legitimacy, neo-patrimonial legitimacy 
or a combination of both. 
1.1.2 Ideological legitimacy 
Ideological legitimacy implies a leader who is perceived as an exceptional, even 
charismatic person with a strong ideological mission. In the Arab world, Nasser is the 
5 HUDSON, M.C., Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy. London, Yale University Press, 1977, p. 
24. 
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classic example, but Hafiz al-Asad's regime can also be considered as partly resting on 
ideological leadership. Although not to the extent of Nasser, Asad has accounted for much 
of the Syrian regime legitimacy through his Arab nationalist credentials in foreign policy. 
Pan-Arab nationalism in foreign policy, this study argues, has been the main component of 
ideological legitimacy in Syria since 1970. Yet, the more Syrian society has modernised 
and the social mobilisation process has developed, the more the ideological legitimacy has 
become vulnerable. As people become more aware of the limits of realising ideological 
ideals, the appropriateness of ideological legitimacy diminishes. 
1.1.3 Neo-patrimonial legitimacy 
Neo-patrimonial legitimacy is a variant of Weber's traditional legitimacy developed by 
Eisenstadt to refer to a traditional-like form of authority -such as tradition of status or 
from use of patronage- persisting in spite of modernisation. The ruler enjoys the personal 
support of his followers because they are his personal kin or clients and he is their patron, 
whose power they support in return for protection or benefits. In Syria, Asad and his 
coterie have made use of such forms of political cement in their attempt to build up the 
state. Although symptoms of neo-patrimonial legitimacy still exist, in the long run their 
public acceptance is declining as society develops and social mobilisation occurs. 
Eisenstadt describes this stage in the evolution as post-traditional; a condition conducive 
neither to Weber's traditional legitimacy nor to legal/rational legitimacy.6 
HUDSON, M.C., a a , p. 17. 
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1.2 M O D E L S O F F O R E I G N P O L I C Y - M A K I N G 
1.2.1 The "rational actor" or "balance of power" model 
1,2.1.1 Concept-description 
The rational actor model does not consider domestic politics to be of paramount 
importance in the decision-making process. The leader of a state acts autonomously of 
internal constraints and is chiefly concerned with the external balance of power. As 
Ehteshami and Hinnebusch suggest: 
"In this model, foreign policy responds almost exclusively to the power 
struggle in the external environment.1,7 
The state, conceived as a unitary actor, pursues rational goals in an attempt to prevent 
another state or group of states from achieving predominance in the international arena or 
regional subsystem. Foreign policy decision-making is a realist, not ideologically shaped 
process, responding to rational criteria and including a consideration of all possible 
alternatives, of the likelihood of attaining these objectives by the various alternatives under 
consideration, and of the benefits or costs of each alternative.8 In this rational process, 
decision-makers evaluate each alternative and select the one which promises to maximise 
utility. They also must be free to choose and quickly change strategy and tactics according 
to the external threats, opportunities and power balance. Consequently, although the 
regime's goals remain consistent, the autonomous rational actor can display a maximum 
flexibility in tactics. 
7 EHTESHAMI, A. & HINNEBUSCH, R.A., The Svrian-lranian Alliance, unpublished manuscript, p. 9. 
6 VIOTTI, P.R. & KAUPI, M.V., International Relations Theory: Realism. Pluralism. Globalism. 
London, Macmillan, 1987, p. 6. 
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1.2.1.2 Criticism on the "rational actor" or "balance of power" model 
The deficiency of this approach lies in the fact that it pays little attention to domestic 
influences. In the rational actor model, the decision-maker is autonomous and is not 
constrained by public opinion. It is assumed that the political elite can achieve this 
because the basis of their power rests upon unchallenged legitimacy, strong state 
institutions and a firm national consensus. 
The rational actor model may seem more appropriate for developed states, however, it is 
my contention that it is an inadequate explanation for foreign policy formulation in the 
Third World. Developing states are still engaged in the process of nation-building, 
accompanied by a profound transformation of society and culture. As such legal/rational 
legitimacy is weak, institutions new and fragile, and national consensus precarious. Most 
elites accept the norm of legitimacy based upon legality, but the "accepted procedures" are 
still largely absent. Due to the lack of solid institutional underpinnings in which 
organisations and procedures acquire value and stability, regime legitimacy remains 
strongly based upon charisma and ideology.9 As such, i f decision-makers ignore the effect 
of foreign policy as it affects public perception of their ideological legitimacy, they risk 
the stability of their regimes. 
It seems apparent that due to the importance of the legitimacy problem in the Third 
World, the rational actor model is insufficient and too extreme for the purpose of this 
study as it ignores the impact of internal legitimacy upon the formulation of foreign 
policy. 
9 HUDSON, M.C., oc , , p. 18. 
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1.2.2 The "domestic politics" model 
1.2.2.1 Concept-description 
The domestic politics model forms the opposite of the rational actor model. Adherents of 
the domestic politics model proclaim that foreign policy decision-making is mainly 
determined by internal factors, which make the decision-making process essentially 
irrational in the sense of not effectively coping with the external environment; foreign 
policy is viewed as exclusively a function or instrument of domestic politics. 
Domestic factors potentially influencing foreign policy decision-making in the Syrian case 
can be divided into two categories: (i) the sectarian struggle and (ii) economic needs and 
interests. The sectarian domestic model can be found in the writings of Pipes; Lawson 
utilises the economic domestic model in explaining Syrian foreign policy decision-making. 
According to Pipes, the Syrian elite forms an authoritarian-sectarian regime, whose prime 
interest in foreign policy decision-making is personal survival and staying in power. In 
this model, the Syrian leadership needs aggressive policies towards Israel to divert 
attention from domestic troubles and the Alawi character of the regime. Outwardly, the 
elite pretends to champion Pan-Arab nationalism; secretly, however, the Syrian regime 
embraces Pan-Syrianism.10 Pipes refers to it as a double game, in which the Alawi regime 
pursues Pan-Syrianism, but gives it a Pan-Arab cast." The sectarian domestic model 
envisages Pan-Arab foreign policy as a tool to keep a minority sectarian regime in power; 
it denies that Syrian policy is shaped by external threats from Israel. 
Lawson suggests that foreign policy decision-making is determined by the economic 
interests of the regime's constituencies. According to this model, the political elite is far 
from autonomous and needs to manipulate foreign policy for domestic reasons. The regime 
1 0 EHTESHAMI, A. & HINNEBUSCH, R.A, o.c. p. 11. 
1 1 PIPES, D., Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 
193. 
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utilises foreign policy in order to maintain the regime coalition and to divert attention 
from economic troubles by generating a sense of drama. Moreover, especially since the 
collapse of the communist bloc as an alternative pole to the capitalist market, there is a 
tendency to sell off foreign policy for oil rent, needed to service regime constituencies.12 
The economic domestic model envisages foreign policy as a mere instrument to extort 
economic aid needed for the ailing economy and to provide diversion from domestic, 
economic problems. 
1.2.2.2 Criticism on the domestic politics model 
Although there may seem to be a logic in the domestic politics argument, neither the 
sectarian domestic politics model nor the economic domestic politics model are suited for 
the purpose of this study. 
The sectarian domestic politics model of Pipes appears to be too extreme when suggesting 
that the sectarian elite in Syria invents external threats to stay in power. The evidence is 
strong that Syria faces and perceives real threats from Israel, which inevitably shape its 
foreign policy. Moreover, the sectarian domestic politics model seems to be underestima-
ting the strength and autonomy of the regime in solely perceiving it as wholly sectarian. 
The economic domestic politics model of Lawson does not seem appropriate for our 
purposes as it ignores external threats and considers foreign policy too largely dependent 
upon economic interests. This suggests a foreign policy decision-making process according 
to an exclusively economic rationale, whereas this study intends to show that foreign 
policy decision-making mainly operates through a rationale based on political incentive. 
1 2 LAWSON, F., "Domestic Pressures and the Peace Process: Fillip or Hindrance?", KIENLE, E. 
(ed.), Economic and Political Liberalisation in Syria. London, I.B. Taurus, 1994, p. 1. 
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Rejecting Pipes' and Lawson's domestic politics models for the purpose of this paper, does 
not imply that this author does not recognise the role of domestic politics in foreign policy 
decision-making. The importance of domestic politics cannot be ignored; however, the 
concept of legitimacy, specifically the regime's need to maintain its legitimacy, appears to 
provide a more suitable way of understanding how domestic politics affects foreign policy. 
Throughout the course of this dissertation, I will show how Asad's regime has been able to 
consolidate itself internally and attain the relative autonomy needed to shape its rational 
foreign policy according to the needs of the external power struggle. Asad managed this 
by continuously protecting his internal Arab nationalist legitimacy in the long run, whilst 
disregarding public opinion in the short run when the external struggle required it. 
Finally, one can conclude that the domestic politics model, similarly to the rational actor 
model, is too extreme for the purpose of this study. The rational actor model focusses too 
exclusively on the external power struggle, whilst the domestic politics model perceives 
foreign policy as too dependent upon domestic conditions. Therefore, the concept of 
"omnibalancing", which envisions an attempt to balance internal and external influences, 
could provide a viable compromise. 
1.2.3 Omnibalancing 
1.2.3.1 Concept-description 
Omnibalancing, a concept invented by Steven David, provides a better explanation of 
regime behaviour in the Third World and adapts various aspects of the formerly discussed 
models. Its major improvement on the balance of power model and the domestic politics 
model, is that it takes both external and internal threats into account. Moreover, 
omnibalancing selects or rejects elements from the balance of power model and the 
domestic politics model, which makes its perspectives much more suitable to examine the 
foreign policy decision-making process in the Third World. 
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Unlike the realist balance of power theory, omnibalancing assumes that Third World 
leaders do not necessarily represent unitary state interests; their prime interest is to ensure 
the political and physical survival of the regime.13 Therefore, the political elite of a state 
rather than the state itself should be the subject of investigation as a comprehensive insight 
of foreign policy decision-making of Third World leaders requires an understanding of 
what is in their best interest and not of what is in the best interest of the state. 
Unlike the domestic politics model, omnibalancing rejects irrationalism in the foreign 
policy decision-making of Third World leaders. In accordance with one of the basic key 
assumptions of realism, foreign policy is perceived to be conducted in a rational manner, 
but from the point of view of the survival of the interests of the regime. 1 4 Omnibalancing, 
however, stands close to the domestic politics model in its perception of internal threats. 
Third_World countries are viewed as unstable, and because they enjoy a smaller degree of 
legitimacy compared to other parts of the world, the omnibalancing theory conceives 
internal threats as more dangerous than external threats.15 Whereas the balance of power 
model confines anarchy to the international arena, omnibalancing considers Third World 
domestic politics as a microcosm of international politics. 1 5 According to omnibalancing, 
balance of power theory is flawed because it ignores internal threats as the most likely 
challenge to leadership of Third World states. 
1.2.3.2 Criticisms of the omnibalancing model 
The author of this dissertation has two interlinked criticisms on the omnibalancing 
formula. 
1 3 DAVID, S., "Explaining Third World Alignment", World Politics. Vol. 43, No. 2, January 1991, p. 
236. 
1 4 DAVID, S., La , p. 237. 
1 5 DAVID, S., La , p. 240. 
, e DAVID, S., L a , p. 243. 
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Firstly, although omnibalancing balances the internal and external struggle, it overstresses 
the internal influence upon foreign policy decision-making. By underestimating the relative 
autonomy of the political leadership in some Third World states, this approach exaggerates 
the instability and weakness of some of these states. Omnibalancing overlooks the fact that 
some Third World states evolved into a further stage in which the state - although not to 
the same extent as in the West - is stronger and more consolidated. 
Secondly, as omnibalancing is too concerned with the impact of internal factors upon 
foreign policy decision-making, it underestimates the importance of external threats. 
Steven David remarks that more Third World leaders have been overthrown by internal 
enemies than external enemies.17 This may be so in Africa and Latin America, but the 
Middle East region provides us with a different situation. In states such as Syria, external 
threats deserve more attention as their foreign policy decision-making is strongly 
determined by the existence of Israel, perceived as a major security threat in the external 
struggle. 
In conclusion, this study accepts the basic premises of the omnibalancing perception, but 
finds that it needs revision in that some Third World states have built relatively strong 
states, whilst facing external threats. The following revised omnibalancing model will aim 
to provide the right framework to examine the roots of Syrian foreign policy today. 
1.2.4 Omnibalancing I I 
Omnibalancing I I aims at providing a framework for Third World states which face an 
external security threat. Omnibalancing I I accepts the premise of omnibalancing that a 
Third World leader has to balance internal and external threats. However, in contradiction 
to omnibalancing, which suggests that the internal threat outbalances the external threat, 
this perspective will argue that in Third World states who face a powerful external threat, 
the external power struggle is the main concern of the state leadership. Furthermore, in 
1 7 DAVID, S., L a , p. 238. 
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this type of state, internal consolidation is likely to take place at an earlier stage than in 
other states. The leader of such a state wishes to establish a stable internal balance, in 
order to increase his legitimacy and regime domestic survival, but equally in order to 
counter external threats. Once states are sufficiently consolidated internally, often through 
a mixture of ideological and neo-patrimonial legitimacy, the leader is able to conduct a 
rational foreign policy with relative freedom, appropriate to external threats and 
opportunities. Foreign policy is characterised by a consistency in goals, but tactical 
flexibility in strategy. In short, in this model the leader may ignore the domestic political 
consequences of foreign policy decisions in the short run, but in the long run he must 
protect his legitimacy. 
Omnibalancing I I suggests a three-stage evolution in state-building for Third World states 
facing an external threat. 
The first stage is a period of instability in which a leader mainly focusses on internal 
politics, attempting to achieve sufficient legitimacy in the eyes of the public opinion by 
broadening his base. 
The second stage heralds a period of relative stability in which the regime balances the 
various sections of its constituency. The centre of attention, however, shifts to the external 
arena. The political elite, through a combination of ideological and neo-patrimonial 
legitimacy, is able to conduct a foreign policy with relative autonomy as long as its 
proclaimed goals remain consistent. 
Some Third World states evolve into a third stage, in which the leader is forced to adjust 
policies as the external environment prevents attainment of his ideological goals. If the 
leader wishes to keep a form of legitimacy, s/he has to adapt to the new conditions by 
seeking a. new basis of legitimacy. This adjustment is often accompanied by a renewed 
interest in the internal arena and a strive to gain a degree of legal/rational legitimacy 
through the provision of economic prosperity and the gradual establishment of legal, 
democratic institutions. 
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In the following chapters, the author intends to illustrate the applicability of this theory in 
Third World countries which face an external threat with evidence on the Syrian case from 
1970 until 1994. 
CHAPTER 2 : 1970-1990 - ACHIEVING AUTONOMY IN THE 
INTERNAL SPHERE 
Within this chapter, I intend to indicate how President Hafiz al-Asad, between 1970 and 
1990, formed a Bonapartist state that governed through quasi-corporatist structures. In this 
section, it is the intention of the author to show how Asad achieved relative autonomy 
from domestic forces by creating a variety of coalitions with differing political agendas. 
Asad broadened his original base by revitalising various elements of the alienated 
bourgeoisie groups, altering the regime's socialist orientated policy into one determined by 
more liberal concerns. 
Economic liberalisation complemented the political rationale of broadening the base of 
support in order to establish and consolidate a stable regime. By carefully balancing the 
interests of the original, ideological constituency against those of the newly emerging 
constituency, the regime gradually transferred its basis of ideological legitimacy into one 
largely based upon a neo-patrimonial/ideological concerns. This strategy increased the 
chances of regime survival, and provided Asad with sufficient time to gain the necessary 
autonomy to pursue a rational foreign policy. 
Chapter two will operate from the assumption that Asad, between 1970 and 1990, created 
a society, in which he was able to exist above the various social groups. Balancing their 
interests against the interests of the state, allowed him to maintain the tools for state-
building and the resilience to reinforce his autonomy. As a consequence, this paper will 
argue that coalition building has consolidated the support of the regime, but has not 
resulted in any significant moves towards democratisation. 
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2.1 ORIGINS OF THE B A ' T H CONSTITUENCY 
In 1970, Asad inherited the Ba'th constituency that had emerged after Syrian independence 
and that had been consolidated after the establishment of the Ba'th regime in 1963. 
Through its ideology, and later on through its socialist policies of nationalisation and land 
reform, the Ba'th had gained a large rural support. Regime legitimacy in this period was 
largely dominated by its ideological component.18 
Ba'th ideology was essentially the expression of the generational and ideological conflict 
that had emerged during and after Syria's bid for independence.19 It provided a counter-
ideology expressing the discontent among the dominated classes in Syria. Its constitution 
and agenda are enshrined in the slogan of Unity, Socialism and Freedom. The Ba'th's 
objectives provide an explanation of the composition of its following. 
The objectives can be summarised in three major points:20 
a. The Ba'th wished to create a strong, stable state with a strong national economy, which 
would mitigate and absorb the existing social conflicts. 
b. The populist aspect of the Ba'th ideology called for socio-economic reforms, a welfare 
state, redistribution of resources and land reform. This part of the Ba'th ideology rejected 
the domination by the comprador elite and later by the national bourgeoisie, and provided 
the Ba'th with a large following among the rural community and segments of the middle 
and lower classes. 
1 8 HINNEBUSCH, R.A., Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba'thist Syria: The Political Economy of Rural 
Development. London, Westview Press, 1989, p. 87. 
1 8 LAPIDUS, I.M., A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p, 
646. 
2 0 HINNEBUSCH, R.A., "Syria Under the Ba'th: State Formation in a Fragmented Society", Arab 
Studies Quarterly. Summer 1982, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 179; HINNEBUSCH, R.A., Peasant and 
Bureaucracy in Ba'thist Syria: The Political Economy of Rural Development, London, Westview 
Press, 1989, p. 16, 19. 
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c. The objective of the nationalist side of the ideology was to unify the Arab nation and 
eradicate foreign presence, including Zionism, in the region. The loss of Palestine had 
largely delegitimised the ruling elites and through the nationalist component of their 
ideology, the Ba'thists increasingly acquired support from the Sunni community. However, 
after the failure of the United Arab Republic between Syria and Egypt, the Ba'thists lost a 
major part of its urban nationalist constituency and became more of a rural party. 
In trying to build a base to challenge the old regime, the Ba'th party combined ideology 
with branch-type party institutions to politically organise and mobilise its constituency. 
Moreover, the Ba'th party placed many of its supporters in the army, providing it with a 
good base in the military and ultimately allowing it to replace the Syrian domestic elite 
through a coup in March 1963. This coup, however, was predominantly carried out by a 
group of young, radical officers and intellectuals, mostly of rural background, not by the 
old, liberal, urban Ba'this and its founders. 
The Ba'th regime's main objective in the early sixties was to consolidate its power amidst 
strong opposition. To do so, it set out to forge a Leninist single party state. This meant 
that the regime was unwilling to share power with the other political forces and that it 
would seek to mobilise, through ideology and party organisation, a constituency among 
peasants, workers and the rural lower middle class. As a result, the Ba'th decreasingly 
represented the interests of the urban higher classes in its composition. 
In addition, the Ba'th nationalised industries and carried out land reforms in order to build 
up its mass support and weaken its rivals in the landed class and the bourgeoisie. These 
measures, naturally, were very unpopular amongst the old landlords and the merchants. 
"In view of the fact that the city people, and in particular the members of 
the professions and the commercial and industrial middle and lower middle 
classes in Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia, Hamah and Horns, form a very 
significant element in terms not only of numbers but also of skills, 
education, administrative competence and economic savoir faire, the neglect 
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of their interests by the Ba'th leaders in the 1960s, through the application 
of insufficiently considered socialist measures, and the fierce hostility that 
this aroused, exposed the Ba'th regime to great perils."21 
The old, moderate Ba'th leaders also rejected these radical, socialist policies, but, after a 
three year struggle for control over the party, they were purged in 1966.22 
Externally, the Ba'th regime sought to legitimise itself by transforming Syria into the key 
state of revolutionary Arab nationalism against Israel and the West. After the crushing 
Arab defeat in 1967 against Israel, this legitimation strategy failed and the radicalist policy 
became the reason for a further split within the Ba'th. A new "realist" wing emerged under 
General Hafiz al-Asad, arguing that in the face of an external threat, the social struggle 
had to be subordinated to national unity.2 3 Asad wished to lend priority to military build 
up and economic growth2 4, needed in the confrontation with Israel, over social reform. In 
order to do so, a retreat from radicalism, moderation of the urban-rural conflict, a detente 
with the bourgeoisie, and a broadening of the regime's base were necessary.25 Asad's 
influence in that direction was already apparent in 1969, but its effect on the radicals' 
policy was negligible upon Jadid's general policy. In November 1970, Asad purged radical 
leader Salah Jadid and his followers26 and introduced his policies of infitah and political 
stabilisation measures. 
2 1 BATATU, H., "Some observations of the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling, Military Group and the 
Causes for its Dominance", Middle East Journal. Summer 1981, Vol. 35, No. 3, p. 340. 
2 2 BRADY, T.F., "Syria leftists stage coup; regime's leaders seized", The New York Times. 
24.02.1966. 
2 3 HINNEBUSCH, R.A., "Syria", in: NIBLOCK, T. & MURPHY, E. (eds.), Economic and Political 
Liberalisation in the Middle East. London, British Academic Press, 1993, p. 182. 
2 4 HIRST, D., "Coup in Syria", The Guardian. 19.10.1970, p. 1. 
2 5 DRYSDALE, A., "The Syrian Political Elite, 1966-1976: A Spatial and Social Analysis", Middle 
Eastern Studies. January 1981, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 12. 
2 6 "Le ministre de la defense aurait pris le pouvoir a Damas", Le Monde. 15-16.11.1970. 
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2.2 1970-1980: ASAD'S FIRST DECENNIUM 
Asad attempted to materialise his political ambition of creating a strong state with a 
broader base through a two-fold strategy; whilst continuing to implement social reforms 
and expanding the Ba'thist political organisation, Asad also pushed through limited 
economic liberalisation and re-structured the political system in order to increase regime 
stabilisation. In doing so, Asad had to act very astutely not to diminish the support of his 
original constituency, which was going to endure the negative consequences of the 
regime's reorientated policies.27 
This dual track policy would prove to work to the advantage of both the regime's 
traditional populist constituency and the co-opted parts of the bourgeoisie.28 At the same 
time, Asad set about constructing a state structure with highly personalised and concentra-
ted power in a dominant presidency which raised above his corporatist-like state, enabling 
him to balance off the various social forces in a Bonapartist fashion.29 By cultivating two 
distinct coalitions (one economic and liberalising, the other political and populist) instead 
of constructing one grand coalition, Asad has avoided making a decisive choice between 
socialism and capitalism or between the bourgeoisie and the lower classes.30 This mixed 
strategy has provided Asad with an amount of flexibility, always enabling him to balance 
between his two coalitions, according to the prevailing conditions.31 
2 7 by our own correspondent, "Private investment to be encouraged", Financial Times. 07.12.1970. 
2 8 HINNEBUSCH, R.A., "Syria", in NIBLOCK, T & MURPHY, E. (eds.), o x . p. 184. 
2 8 HINNEBUSCH, R.A., "Syria Under the Ba'th: State Formation in a Fragmented Society", Arab 
Studies Quarterly, Summer 1982, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 184, SCRUTON, R., A Dictionary of Political 
Thought. London, McMillan Press, 1982, p. 42. 
3 0 HEYDEMANN, S., "The Political Logic of Economic Rationality: Selective Stabilisation in Syria", in: 
BARKEY, H. (ed.), The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East. New York, St. Martin's 
Press, 1992, p. 21. 
3 ' HINNEBUSCH, R.A., "Rural Politics in Ba'thist Syria: A Case Study in the Role of the Countryside 
in the Political Development of Arab Societies", Review of Politics. 1982, Vol. 44, No. 1, p. 129. 
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2.2.1 Syria's Infitah Policies during the 1970s 
Syria's infitah policies in the 1970s can be divided into two partly overlapping stages: a 
first period running from 1970 to the 1973 War, followed by a period of intensified 
economic liberalisation in 1974/75 that began to peter out by 1977.32 Each of these stages 
has different goals and is aimed at different sections of the bourgeoisie stratum. 
During the period between Asad's seizure of power and the outset of the 1973 War, Asad 
introduced a number of measures which aimed to reassure the remaining private sector in 
Syria and ease the command economy that the radicals had tried to build. Moreover, his 
policies were also aimed to encourage the old bourgeoisie who had left Syria after the 
start of the nationalisations, to return and start up new businesses.33 The regime's new 
measures had some results, since an increasing number of small, private manufacturing 
and service businesses emerged.34 
After the 1973 War, Asad combined statism with limited economic liberalisation. As a 
frontline state, Syria received abundant Arab foreign aid 3 5 and the oil embargo of 1973 
provoked a rise in oil prices36, providing Syria with higher oil revenues. This allowed 
Asad to intensify his dual strategy. The increased revenues of the Syrian state were 
utilised for bureaucratic and public sector expansion; and, although the state led the 
development of the national economy, the regime also assigned a role to the private sector, 
especially in the less capital intensive ventures that would secure quick returns. As foreign 
3 2 PERTHES, V., "Stages of Economic and Political Liberalisation in Syria", in: KIENLE, E. (ed.), 
Economic and Political Liberalisation in Syria. London, I.B. Taurus, 1994, p. 2. 
3 3 "Damas veut attirer les capitaux des emigres arabes", Le Jour (Beirut), 21.02.1971. 
3 4 "Syrie: Cooperation accrue avec le secteur prive", Le Monde. 24.02.1971. 
3 5 "Abu Dhabi to buy Syria new refinery", Daily Star (Beirut), 24.10.1973; "Syria to get £100 million in 
foreign aid", Daily Star (Beirut), 04.07.1974; "Accord de cooperation economique entre la Syrie et 
les Emirats Arabes Unis", Aaence France Presse. 09.11.1974; "Arab Fund lends E13.8 M to Syria", 
Daily Star (Beirut), 23.12.1974; "Trois accords de financement signe par la Syrie", L'Orient (Beirut), 
24.12.1974. 
"Damascus was expecting bigger oil cuts, says Syrian minister", Daily News (Turkey), 20.10.1973. 
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exchange and state revenues were available, Asad engaged in further economic liberalisati-
on through the encouragement of the merchant bourgeoisie and the fostering of local 
contractors. The regime also increasingly tolerated the rise of middle men between the 
state and foreign companies, allowing them to compete for a share of the state contracts 
financed by state oil revenues. By distributing the oil wealth available to it, the Syrian 
state acquired some of the characteristics of a patron state seeking to win legitimacy, in 
neo-patrimonial fashion, by materially rewarding its followers and supporters. 
Asad economically liberalised in a selective way, enhancing the economic position of 
favoured elements of the private sector without giving it a credible share of the political 
power. Through its policies, the Syrian state in the 1970s became the pole around which 
various fragments of a new state dependent bourgeoisie began to form. 3 7 In the 1970s 
large segments of the private sector remained dependent upon the goodwill of the regime. 
As a result, an independent cohesive bourgeoisie could not be consolidated. The subgroups 
of the Syrian business community proved to have different origins and interests and 
therefore could not provide a common front. Moreover, the state's policies of selective 
liberalisation, playing one segment of the private sector against the other, prevented the 
bourgeoisie to develop from a "class in itself" to a "class for itself".38 Perthes claims: 
"Being able to satisfy discrimitavely the demands of limited subgroups of 
Syria's business community, the regime was in position to fragment the 
private sector politically and prevent it from becoming a collective negotia-
tor. 1,39 
At the same time, the political elite became increasingly embourgeoised as they acquired 
wealth through corruption, utilised the black market, and entered political and marriage 
3 7 HINNEBUSCH, R.A., "Syria", in: NIBLOCK, T. & MURPHY, E. (eds.), oc , , p. 184. 
3 8 BAHOUT, J . , 'The Syrian Business Community and Prospects of Political Change", in: KIENLE, E. 
(ed.), o.c. p. 10. 
3 9 PERTHES, V., "Stages of Economic and Political Liberalisation in Syria", in: KIENLE, E. (ed.), o c ^ 
p. 7. 
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alliances with the bourgeoisie.40 They became known as the state bourgeoisie. According 
to Seale, Asad closed his eyes to this emerging phenomenon. He writes: 
"to govern and modernise Syria, Asad believed he needed a strong monied 
class of his own men which would supersede the sons of the old bourgeoi-
sie. "41 
In spite of the process of embourgeoisement of the political elite, it did not see its 
interests as identical to those of the bourgeoisie. Although the state encouraged a 
resurgence of the bourgeoisie, it continued to restrict the private sector within distinct 
boundaries, preserving its dominant grip over "national" economic sectors and not 
considering privatisation of inefficient state-owned industries, even when this was 
economically irrational.42 This suggests that in Asad's policies the political logic 
outbalances the economic logic. Bureaucracy and public sector - even i f they are 
inefficient - had to remain in the hands of the state, because of their powerful role of 
political control. With this strategy, the autonomy of the regime continued to be protected 
from the bourgeoisie. 
From 1976/77 onwards, the Syrian regime came increasingly under pressure. Disap-
pointment with the regime's policies among the social forces damaged by them (especially 
the traditional urban quarters), became more and more apparent as inflation, corruption, 
nepotism and illegal enrichment of the regime elite became more obvious.43 Coinciding 
with the deterioration in Syria's economy, discontent also rose about Syria's intervention in 
Lebanon. From this environment, political Islam established a foundation to challenge the 
4 0 HINNEBUSCH, R.A., "The Politics of Liberalisation in Syria", Conference paper, Durham, Autumn 
1993, p. 5. 
4 1 SEALE, P., Asad: Struggle for the Middle East. London, I.B. Taurus, 1988, p. 457. 
4 2 HEYDEMANN, S., 'The Political Logic of Economic Rationality: Selective Stabilisation in Syria", in: 
BARKEY, H. (ed.), a t , p. 20. 
4 3 PERTHES, V„ "Stages of Economic and Political Liberalisation in Syria", in: KIENLE, E. (ed.), o ^ 
p. 12. 
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regime with its counter-ideology. The regime's decisive crushing of the Islamic opposition, 
however, ultimately enhanced its autonomy from society.44 
2.2.2 Asad's Political Restructuring 
2.2.2.1 Limited political liberalisation 
Asad's infitah was accompanied by a restructuring of the political arena and the foundation 
of several new political institutions. This creation of new institutions, however, can hardly 
be considered as a political democratisation effort. Although it broadened the regime's 
political base and provided it with a higher legitimacy, it was primarily meant to stabilise 
the regime, to neutralise the opposition and to heighten the regime's control over 
opposition and Syrian society. 
One of the first acts of Asad was the creation in 1971 of the "Majlis al-shab"45, the 
People's Council or Asad's idea of a Parliament. It consisted of 173 members: an absolute 
majority of 87 Ba'thists, 8 Communists and 36 representatives of the farmers.46 In 1973, 
the People's Council was for the first time elected, instead of appointed. It is very difficult, 
however, to consider this creation as a Parliament as it did not have any legislative 
powers4 7 
In March 1972, the National Progressive Front (al-jabba al-taqaddamia al-watania) was 
established48 This new body consisted of 18 members, elected from the People's Council: 
4 4 AYUBI, N., Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. London, Routledge, 1991, p. 
93. 
4 5 "Damas: Un conseil du peuple de 173 membres (dont le chef de I'etat)", L'Orient (Beirut), 
17.02.1971. 
4 6 HOPWOOD, D„ Syria. 1945-1986: Politics and Society. London, Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 56. 
4 7 DEVLIN, J.F. , Syria: Modern State in an Ancient Land, London, Westview Press, 1983, p. 61. 
4 8 "Le front progressiste d'union nationale a ete officiellement cree", Le Monde. 15.02.1972. 
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half of them were Ba'thists; the other 50% formed the opposition and were a group of 
tolerated, smaller parties. The creation of the NPF provides an example of the regime's 
stabilisation tactics. The Ba'th holds theCabsolute majority in the front and is the only party 
that could recruit its members in the army and in the universities. The co-opted parties 
were neutralised as they were represented in an official body, but had less potential than if 
they had not been incorporated. Moreover, these parties were divided over whether or not 
to accept NPF conditions, and were therefore further weakened. Although to the outside, 
Asad's political base seemed to have broadened substantially, it became apparent that Asad 
had only incorporated the opposition into official institutions to maintain a tighter control 
over their activities. 
2.2.2.2 Neo-patrimonialism 
After seizing power, Asad faced a dilemma. If he wished to broaden the regime's power 
base, pursue national unity and introduce major social reforms, Asad needed to maintain 
power. However, in order to retain his power, Asad recognised the benefits of utilising 
sectarian, regional and tribal loyalties to consolidate his regime49. Use of such ties, 
however, had the potential to undermine the legitimacy of his regime and the construction 
of a genuinely unified Syrian state, which was deemed necessary for stability inside Syria 
and for the struggle against the Zionist entitity. 
Although the agenda of the Ba'th party had never been specifically designed for 
minorities, its message since the early days of independence had always had particular 
appeal to these groups.50 The national secular aspect of the Ba'th ideology attracted the 
non-Sunni sections of the population as it regarded them as ful l Arab Syrian nationals, 
4 6 VAN DAM, N., The Struggle for Power in^Svria: Sectarianism. Regionalism and Tribalism in 
Politics. 1961-1980. London, Croom Helm( 1981, p. 94. 
5 0 KESSLER, M.N., Syria: Fragile Mosaic of Power. Washington, D.C., National Defense University 
Press, 1987, p. 28. 
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irrespective of religion5 1; the socialist message of the Ba'th ideology gave the poorer 
people, notably the minority Alawis, hope to improve their living standards through 
economic and social reforms. 
Often members of minority sects gravitated to the army as it provided the only avenue for 
political and social advancement open to them in a Sunni-dominated society. Members of 
the Sunni community tended to enter business after their military service, whilst the 
minorities often continued in the army. This resulted with an imbalance of the minorities 
in the lower ranks of the army. By the end of the 1950s and in the early 1960s, power 
struggles among the Sunni officers instigated a fragmentation of loyalties as purges 
became common place. Younger officers - many of them both Ba'thist and members of 
minorities - were promoted to replace the purged Sunni officers, resulting in the effective 
loss of control over the army by the Sunni community.52 This situation provided the 
opposition with the occasion to launch a coup on 8 March 1963, which became kown as 
the Ba'th Revolution.53 
After the 1963-coup, the Alawis gradually gained a dominant position within the Ba'th 
party and in political life through a purge against the Druze in 1966 and against the 
remaining bloc of rural Sunnis in 1968.S4 The struggle which followed between the 
radicals led by Jadid and Asad's realists was between two Alawi-dominated blocs. The 
struggle between these two blocs can be characterised by a distinct reliance upon one's 
sect or even tribe, and personal loyalty. The rivalry between the two wings resulted in 
favour of the realist wing after Asad's coup on 13 November 1970. In view of the fact that 
most prominent Sunni, Druze and Isma'ili officer factions in the Armed Forces had been 
purged or neutralised, the only real challenge to Asad's regime could only come from 
5 1 FAKSH, M.A., "The Alawi Community of Syria: A New Dominant Force", Middle Eastern Studies. 
April 1984, Vol. 20, No. 2, p. 141. 
5 2 OLSON, R„ The Ba'th and Svria. 1947 to 1982: The Evolution of Ideology. Party and State. 
Princeton, Kingston Press, 1982. 
5 3 KESSLER, M.N., o o , p. 29. 
5 4 BATATU, H., Lc^, p. 343. 
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within the Alawi community. According to Van Dam 5 5, Asad, therefore, formed an inner 
core of supporters around him with whom he had a close personal relationship, such as 
members of his own family, tribe, or village and its surroundings to secure his position, 
even against the people of his own religious community. 
Asad, whilst seemingly broadening the regime's legitimacy base, at the same time 
developed a small coterie of confidants around him, allowing him to maintain tight 
personal control over the military, the security services, and communications. 
2.2.2.3 Corporatism 
Asad also intensified his control over the Ba'th's original constituency, particulary over the 
popular organisations such as the Trade Unions and the Peasant Unions. After his coup, he 
had purged all the radical elements in these organisations and by 1974, he controlled them 
completely through their transformation from radical syndicates into quasi-corporatist 
institutions.56 Although the popular organisations grew considerably in numerical and 
organisational strength, they lost too much of their autonomy to enable them to resist the 
regime's unpopular policies. 
"Both the Trade Unions and the Peasant union, and other less important 
popular organisations such as the women's and students' unions and the 
official youth organisation, became quasi-official, non-voluntary, exclusive 
bodies, entrusted with certain quasi-governmental functions and substantial 
functions of control. Their leadership was hand-picked by the regime and 
became part of the regime's elite."57 
5 5 VAN DAM, N., o a , p. 90. 
^ P E R T H E S , V., "Stages of Economic and Political Liberalisation in Syria", in: KIENLE, E. (ed), ac,., 
p. 9. 
5 7 PERTHES, V., "Stages of Economic and Political Liberalisation in Syria", in: KIENLE, E. (ed.), oc . , 
p. 10. 
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In January 1973, a new Constitution was issued58, in which Asad institutionalised his 
presidential, personal regime, providing him with considerable powers on political, 
military, legislative and administrative levels. These measures allowed Asad to govern 
with increasing autonomy, balancing the interests of heterogenous social groups in an 
evolving quasi-corporatist state. 
By 1974, most of Asad's political restructuring programme was in place and these 
measures were not transformed into any form of political liberalisation. This policy shows, 
that the regime's ultimate goal - although attempting to broaden its base through economic 
liberalisation - was politically motivated, attempting to consolidate its existence and 
relative autonomy through a combination of institutionalising a quasi-corporatist state and 
the creation of a broader political base, taking the form of alternative coalitions. 
In terms of regime legitimacy, Asad's policies in his first decennium can be summarised in 
the following ways. Whilst constructing a neo-patrimonial base of authority around the 
presidency in order to maintain relative autonomy, the regime also attempted to preserve a 
degree of ideological legitimacy the regime by continuing to adhere to an Arab nationalist 
policy and consolidating the social reforms needed to retain the support of its original, 
plebeian social constituency. In the meantime, however, the regime issued policies of 
limited economic liberalisation and political stabilisation in order to neutralise traditionally 
opposed sections of society and to gradually gain some legal/rational legitimacy. 
2.3 1980-1990: ASAD'S SECOND DECENNIUM 
Although the Syrian regime did eradicate the Islamic rebellion of the late 1970s and the 
early 1980s, its chances of survival were brought into question. Economic stagnation set in 
for much of the 1980s, as a result of the inability of the regime to turn its public sector 
into an efficient engine of capital accumulation. Asad, realising that his public sector was 
not sufficiently dynamic to lift Syria out of its economic crisis, set about deepening 
"Syria to debate Budget, Permanent Constitution", Daily Star (Beirut), 03.01.1973. 
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economic liberalisation. His economic policies, however, were not based upon an 
economic rationale, but were mainly driven by political considerations. The economic 
crisis of the 1980s provided Asad with the opportunity to legitimise changes in policy 
which, however, served his political interests more than purely economic logic. 
In this section, I intend to follow Heydemann's line when he writes: 
"The cumulative impact of circumstances necessitated Syria's gradual move 
towards stabilisation-style reforms after 1981, but the decision to introduce 
these policies independent of the IMF was clearly a political decision taken 
despite the country's limited resources and limited alternative lending 
sources. 
Asad selectively coopted sectors previously excluded from the regime's coalition into his 
quasi-corporatist state. He selected those segments of the private sector which had a high 
capacity to accumulate foreign exchange, whilst remaining too weak to organise 
themselves as an opposition group against the regime.60 These forces were indispensable in 
securing the resources necessary to satisfy the demands of the regime's original constituen-
cy, which remained politically important but was an economical burden. Moreover, this 
strategy also permitted Asad to broaden his political base and legitimacy beyond the Ba'th. 
This, however, does not imply that Asad's economic liberalisation process was accompa-
nied by political democratisation. During most of the 1980s, the Syrian regime did not 
introduce any political adjustments. Only after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
changes in Eastern Europe did Syria decide on some form of political restructuring. 
Hinnebusch refers to this process as "calculated political decompression" as it forms a 
substitute for substantial political pluralisation.61 This wil l be discussed in Chapter 4. 
5 9 HEYDEMANN, S., 'The Political Logic of Economic Rationality: Selective Stabilisation in Syria", in: 
BARKEY, H. (ed.), o .c . p. 18. 
8 0 HEYDEMANN, S„ "The Political Logic of Economic Rationality: Selective Stabilisation in Syria", in: 
BARKEY, H. (ed.), oc^, p. 19. 
8 1 HINNEBUSCH, R.A., "The Politics of Liberalisation in Syria", Conference paper. Durham, 1993, p. 
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2.3.1 Syria's second Infitah 
The inability of the Syrian public sector to acquire sufficient resources, its increasing 
foreign debts, and its failure of capitalist accumulation, pushed the regime to turn to the 
private sector for help and to gradually change its development policy from import 
substitution to an export oriented strategy. 
Until 1987, the infitah was still centred on import substitution. Although Asad during the 
Eight Regional Congress in 1985, openly backed a larger role and greater scope for the 
private sector, his rhetoric was not followed by clear policy directives.62 A gradual shift in 
policy only became apparent after 1986, when Syria was faced with a foreign currency 
crisis, because it had continued its policy of import substitution in spite of continuous 
balance of payments deficits.63 A major breakthrough would only follow when Asad 
signed the Legislative Decree No. 10 in May 1991 6 4 , encouraging investments from 
Syrians, expatriates, Arab and foreign investors in foreign currency in the Syrian economy, 
except in tourism.65 
The infitah policies of the late 1980s combined with a deteriorating performance of the 
public sector have resulted in a substantial relative growth of the private sector and a 
reduced role of the state in the Syrian economy. Although the liberalisation policies 
reached much deeper than the ones in the 1970s, one should bare in mind two major 
requisites for the success of the regime's economic policies in the 1980s: 
Firstly, the loss of state control over parts of the economy, does not imply that the private 
sector can enforce its own policies; the government continues to determine the timing and 
8 2 SEALE, P., oc , , p. 452. 
8 3 KIENLE, E., "The Return of Politics? Scenarios for Syria's Second Infitah", in: KIENLE, E. (ed.), 
o .c . p. 5. 
9 4 "Investment law comes into force", Middle East Economic Digest (MEED). 17.05.1991. 
8 5 AFFAKI, B.G., "La Loi No. 10 sur la Promotion des Investissements: Une Nouvelle Donne sur le 
Marche Syrien", Revue de Droit des Affaires Internationales. 1992, No. 4, p. 385. 
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the scope of liberalisation measures. The regime has only liberalised selectively, taking 
into account its political objectives and allying itself only with some segments of the 
bourgeoisie. As a result, some parts of the bourgeoisie enriched themselves substantially, 
thereby widening the gap with the vast petite bourgeoisie majority and increasing its 
fragmentation.66 
Secondly, no matter how economically irrational it might be to maintain the public sector, 
until 1990 the regime had no plans to dismantle it, as the public sector remained a major 
component of the state's client network. It was a key source of employment and an 
important instrument of control. Indeed, the dependency of the regime upon the private 
sector during the economic crisis, with only limited demands of the public sector seems to 
suggest the regime's determination to protect its original constituency from the demands of 
stabilisation.67 
6 6 PERTHES, V., "Stages of Economic and Political Uberalisation in Syria", in: KIENLE, E. (ed.), o o , 
p. 20, 22. 
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BARKEY, H. (ed.), O.C,, p. 31. 
CHAPTER 3 : 197© - 199© THE RATIONAL ACTOR IN THE 
EXTERNAL SPHERE 
In this chapter, the author intends to convey how Asad, between 1970 and 1990, has 
conducted his foreign policy in a rational manner. To fully appreciate this, it is essential to 
distinguish between policy objectives and the strategy employed to achieve them. Asad 
sometimes appeared to employ tactics which deviated from the standards of Arab 
nationalism, but, nevertheless, served the pursuit of his ultimate Arab nationalist goal, 
which remained remarkably consistent over the years. In an interview with Newsweek in 
1974, Asad made his objectives very clear: 
"For our part we look upon peace in its true sense...a peace without 
occupation, without destitute peoples, and without citizens whose homeland 
is denied to them.. Anyone who imagines that the peace process can be a 
piecemeal is mistaken...We say now as we have always said - that peace 
should be based on complete withdrawal from the lands occupied in 1967 
and on the full restoration of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people.1,68 
Asad's tactical flexibility in his foreign policy decision-making, however, affected the 
regime's ideological legitimacy within Syria. This suggests that the regime enjoyed only 
relative autonomy in the pursuance of its foreign policy objectives. In this chapter, the 
author will attempt to illustrate that Asad, in order to maintain a degree of legitimacy, had 
to justify his political manoeuvering in an Arab nationalist guise. 
SEALE, P., o o , p. 256. 
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Due to the wealth of literature and the variety of case studies available, this chapter will 
be confined to four principle sections: 
(i) Pan-Arab aspirations 
(ii) Foreign policy objectives 
(iii) Asad's pan-Arab strategy 
(iv) The Palestinians in Lebanon: A case study illustrating tactical flexibility. 
3.1 PAN-ARAB ASPIRATIONS 
Pan-Arabism faced a crushing defeat after the June War of 1967.59 Until this point pan-
Arabism included the total liberation of Palestine. The monumental defeat of 1967 and the 
emergence of Hafiz al-Asad as the realist strategist70 in Syria played an instrumental role 
in redefining the essential tenets of pan-Arabism. 
Prior to 1967, an objective of pan-Arabism was the removal of Israel and the return of 
Palestine to the Arab fold. However, 
"the 1967 defeat had underlined the vulnerability of the Arab system of 
states, the bankruptcy of the Arab order and its guardians. The champions 
of pan-Arabism were defeated in the Arab system; the idea had lost its 
magic. "71 
8 9 AJAMI, F„ "The End of Pan-Arabism", in: FARAH, T.E. (ed.), Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism: 
The Continuing Debate. London, Westview Press, 1987, p. 98. 
7 0 HINNEBUSCH, R.A., "Revisionist Dreams, Realist Strategies: The Foreign Policy of Syria", in: 
KORANY, B. & DESSOUKI, A.E.H. (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenges of 
Change. Oxford, Westview Press, 1991, p. 374. 
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After Asad seized power in 1970, he attempted to introduce more moderate ambitions and 
realistic pan-Arab goals for Syria. He was in a suitable position to do so, as the Arab 
world had lost Nasser as its leader. 
"The departure of the greatest Arab leader of modern times left a yawning 
gap in Arab politics. There was no longer one leader who could dominate 
the scene. By coincidence of timing, as Nasser died Asad was beginning his 
tenure of power. He became the ruler of Syria, a dominating figure but, 
unlike Nasser, with little appeal to the masses outside his own country. "n 
Asad tactically accepted the status quo of the regional sub-system of states and the 
resolutions 242 and 338.73 Within this paper, I intend to show how Asad has remained 
consistent with the redefined objectives of pan-Arabism since 1970. 
If one is to conceptualise pan-Arab aspirations as the liberation of the occupied territories, 
it is then necessary to identify Syrian foreign policy objectives and consider their 
compatibility with this scaled-down version of pan-Arabism. 
3.2 SYRIAN F O R E I G N P O L I C Y O B J E C T I V E S 
When examining Syria's foreign policy since 1970, one can deduce four main objectives:74 
7 2 HOPWOOD, D., a a , London, Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 54. 
7 3 HINNEBUSCH, R.A., "Revisionist Dreams, Realist Strategies: The Foreign Policy of Syria", in: 
KORANY, B. & DESSOUKI, A.E.H. (eds.), oc^, p. 379. 
7 4 RAMET, P., The Soviet-Syrian Relationship Since 1955: A Troubled Alliance. Oxford, Westview 
Press, 1990, p. 7-8; RABINOVICH, I., "The Foreign Policy of Syria: Goals, Capabilities, Constraints 
and Options", Survival. 1982, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 175; MCLAURIN, R.D., MUGHISUDDIN, M. & 
WAGNER, A.R., Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East: Domestic Influences on Policy in Egypt. 
Iraq. Israel, and Syria. London, Praeger Publishers, 1977, p. 250; HINNEBUSCH, R.A., "Revisionist 
Dreams, Realistic Strategies: The Foreign Policy of Syria", in: KORANY, B. & DESSOUKI, A. (eds.), 
O.C. p. 375, 379, 392-393. 
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(i) defense of the Syrian state in attempting to restore and preserve territorial integrity 
(ii) priority to the more realistic goal of recovery of the occupied territories, in particular 
the Golan, rather than the liberation of Palestine. Achievement of Palestinian national 
rights in West Bank and Gaza. 
(iii) terminate the state of diplomatic isolation in which Syria found itself throughout the 
1960s, by asserting its regional influence. 
(iv) resist and contain territorial expansion into the region by foreign powers, mainly the 
United States and Israel. 
Overall, Syrian foreign policy objectives have been compatible with Syria's pan-Arab 
aspirations. The perception that Asad, in pursuing his foreign policy, seems to deviate 
from his pan-Arab aspirations can be explained through the tactical flexibility with which 
Asad responds to threats, constraints or opportunities in the international system. 
3.3 ASAD'S PAN-ARAB S T R A T E G Y 
Hafiz al-Asad's strategy for the liberation of the occupied territories took shape as part of 
his "Corrective Movement" in 1970. It was a realist response to Jadid's former rejectionist 
posture in relation to Israel. Syria's new stance would become more explicit after the 
1973-war. Whilst Asad's goal concerning the occupied territories and Israel remained 
consistent throughout the years, his strategies evolved considerably. 
3.3.1 1970-1973: war for peace 
Israel's victory in the 1967-war had left the Arabs with a profound feeling of humiliation 
and bitterness. Israel had taken control over the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, the 
Golan Heights and the Sinai peninsula, and since then there had been no concessions over 
these occupied territories. Asad was aware that this status quo was likely to remain unless 
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the "no peace, no war"75 situation in the Middle East received greater attention from the 
superpowers. Asad, therefore, wished to launch another war in an attempt to alter the 
balance of power in favour of the Arab states, hoping that in this way Israel would 
ultimately be pressured into serious negotiations on the basis of Security Council 
Resolution 242 of 1967. Still consolidating his power against the radicals, Asad had, in 
December 1970, reaffirmed Syria's rejection of the UN 242 resolution on the grounds that 
it meant the "liquidation of the Palestinian question".76 By 1971, however, Asad was 
hinting that UN resolution 242 might be accepted on condition that it was interpreted to 
guarantee Palestinian rights. 
Syria continued its preparation for war by breaking out of its isolation, especially by 
restoring relations with Saudi-Arabia, by building up a solid relation with the Soviet 
Union, and by moving towards cooperation with Egypt. Improving ties with both the 
Soviet Union and Egypt was essential to Asad's strategy for defeating Israel. The Soviet 
Union provided the main source for developing the capacity of Syria's army; an alliance 
with Egypt forming a two-front bloc against Israel was the only viable option if the 1973 
War was to become a success. 
Nevertheless, although Egypt and Syria had carefully prepared plans, it became apparent at 
the outbreak of the war that their specific aims differed. Whereas Asad wished to liberate 
all the Arab lands occupied after the 1967 War, Sadat only wanted a "limited war"77 
through which he could revive his peace diplomacy with a shock to the status quo. Sadat's 
aims were satisfied with the return of the Sinai, whilst for Syria the return of the Golan 
was considered only a first step for negotiations. 
7 5 DUPUY, T.N., Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars. 1947-1974, London, Macdonald and Jane's, 
1978, p. 387. 
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"Asad went to war because he believed there could be no satisfactory 
negotiation with Israel until the Arabs had snatched back some at least of 
their lost land. Peace-making, he believed, could be a product of war, but 
not a substitute for it. Sadat went to war because the peace diplomacy he 
was already conducting, covertly as well as overtly, had faltered. He 
thought a shock would revive it. "7S 
It would appear that from 1970 until the October War, Asad considered war as the best 
strategic option to fulf i l his pan-Arab aspirations. This strategy was revised at the outset of 
the war in an attempt to seize upon the military gains through diplomatic channels as 
Syria had not been able to hold the part of th Golan it liberated, but actually lost a sliver 
of extra territory before the cease-fire. 
3.3.2 1973-1979: land for peace 
The October War nevertheless provided sufficient momentum to challenge the status quo. 
For the first time, Israel's military superiority had come into question; combined with the 
oil embargo this convinced the West of the potential costs of failing to accommodate Arab 
interests.79 Asad recognised the potential of diplomacy and changed the balance of strategy 
away from the military option. Convinced that a comprehensive settlement was achievable 
as long as the Arabs refrained from making separate peace deals, he accepted for the first 
time possible negotiations based upon the UN resolutions 338 and 242.80 The United 
States and in particular its Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ruled out the possibility of a 
comprehensive settlement and opted for step-by-step diplomacy; limited agreements would 
be reached between Israel and individual Arab states on a bilateral basis. The PLO would 
7 9 SEALE, P., M „ p. 195. 
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be excluded from all negotiations.81 Syria's hope that the Arab states would refrain from 
bilateral negotiations with Israel under the auspices of the United States, were quickly 
dashed. Indeed, although nothing of the sort had been discussed during the pre-war 
planning, Egypt unilaterally decided to engage in Sinai military disengagement talks with 
Israel.82 As a result, a first disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel was signed 
on 18 January 1974.83 
Out of fear that Syria would be left out of any settlement, Asad then agreed to negotiate 
with Kissinger for disengagement on the Syrian front on the condition that a disengage-
ment would not become a substitute for an overall settlement.84 Despite Asad's hard 
bargaining and due to Kissinger's success in isolating Syria in the course of the 
negotiations, Asad had to settle for an agreement where Syria only recovered the territory 
lost during the 1973 War and a small strip of what was lost during the June War. In 
return, UN troops would be stationed between the Syrian and Israeli lines.85 The 
agreement was signed in Geneva on 31 May 1974.86 
Until the signing of the Camp David Accords, many ways for a peace settlement were 
proposed, but none of them gained momentum. Syria wanted to establish an international 
conference, where - under the supervision of the United Nations, the United States and the 
Soviet Union - a comprehensive solution for the occupied territories and the Palestinian 
problem could be reached between a united Arab delegation and Israel. In doing so, Asad 
attempted to avoid a second separate disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel. 
However, he failed and, in September 1975, Egypt, Israel and the US signed the trilateral 
1 SEALE, P., p. 217. 
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Sinai 2. 8 7 This agreement resulted in the complete rupture of relations between Egypt and 
Syria. Moreover, it enabled Israel to concentrate its forces on the Syrian front, creating an 
intensified security threat for Syria. Israel realised that Asad had lost his bargaining 
position as without Egypt, he had lost the deterrent factor of a credible military tlireat. 
In the period between the signing of the second disengagement agreement and the signing 
of the Camp David Accords in 1979, a gradual policy change took place in Syria. Asad 
realised that Syria needed to build up its military and regional importance if it wanted to 
be credible in any peace negotiations. Therefore, in the early 1980s, whilst striving to 
achieve military and political parity with Israel, Asad adopted a policy of "tactical 
rejectionism".88 Syria moved closer to the Soviet Union - a necessary step in its strive for 
military parity - and in the meanwhile refrained from further negotiations, attempting to 
prevent any US initiative on Israeli terms. In implementing this policy, Syria developed 
into a major regional power, whose interests could not be ignored in potential peace 
initiatives. As Ma'oz and Yaniv write and as will be illustrated in the next section: 
"Syria has become the key to any solution in Lebanon and a dead-weight on 
the Arab-Israeli peace process. It may not be an established fact that Syria 
can prevent any serious move towards an Arab-Israeli settlement, but it is 
no longer a fantasy to argue that this is so.1,89 
3.3.3 1979-1985: the strive for strategic parity 
Syria's doctrine of strategic parity grew out of frustration with the Camp David peace 
treaty between Egypt and Israel and the exhaustion of the peace process. Its determination 
for strategic parity grew even more after Israel's annexation of the Golan in December 
8 7 SEALE, P., o a , p. 258. 
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1981.90 The reason why Asad opted for the doctrine of strategic parity did not emanate 
from a revived war option but rather, it stemmed from his belief that a credible deterrent 
was necessary. The cornerstone of this policy was the conviction that as long as Israel 
maintained its overall superiority, no just settlement could be attained.91 
Although by the second half of the 1980s, Syria had built up sufficient military strength to 
deter Israel, it was not enough to adjust the balance of strategic parity in its favour. In 
practice, Syria could possibly withstand an Israeli military offensive, but it seems unlikely 
that it would or could launch a successful attack itself. This shortcoming can be attributed 
to the fact that military parity is only one aspect in the drive for strategic parity. Strategic 
parity, however, also includes aspects such as manpower and technological advancement, 
economic capabilities and the quality of coherence within the Arab world. Syria found 
itself in a disadvantaged position on all these complementary aspects. 
3.3.3.1 Man power and technological advancement 
Although the Syrian army has proved to be effective on several occasions (i.e. 1973 War, 
Lebanon), it has not capitalised upon its military successes. In fact, only when a new Arab 
alliance would re-emerge, could the Israeli troops be outnumbered. George Ball calculated 
that by 1986, a Syrian-Jordanian-Iraqi coalition would have been able to mobilise 1.27 
million men to Israel's 700,000.9Z However, such an Arab war coalition has been lacking 
ever since the 1973 War. 
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3.3.3.2 Economic capacity 
In contrast with Israel, Syria's economy faced many difficulties. The cost for its 
intervention in Lebanon and its aim for military parity with Israel had severely strained the 
Syrian economy. Moreover, as a result of Asad's growing isolation in the Arab world, 
Syria received less oil-revenues and financial support from the other Arab states.93 
"The more successful Asad has been in pursuing his regional strategic 
ambitions, the more financial benefits, mainly in form of Gulf Arab aid, 
have accrued; conversely, when things have gone against Asad, as was the 
case through the early 1980s, Syria has suffered financially."94 
3.4 1985-1990: B R E A K I N G OUT O F ISOLATION 
3.4.1 Rapprochement with Jordan 
The start of a new era in inter-Arab politics was marked in December 1985 with the talks 
between president Asad and King Hussain of Jordan. It was their first meeting since 
January 1979.95 Diplomatic relations between Syria and Jordan had ceased after the Camp 
David Accords. As a result of this peace treaty, Jordan had become increasingly pressured 
to conduct bilateral negotiations with Israel over the occupied West Bank. Out of protest 
for these potentially direct negotiations between Jordan and Israel and out of a fear to be 
excluded from any settlement, Asad had broken all relations with Jordan. The abrogation 
in relations between the two countries grew even stronger when in the Iran-Iraq war, 
9 3 LAWSON, F . , "Liberalisation economique en Syrie et en Irak", Maghreb Machrek. 1 9 9 1 , vol. 9, 
No. 128, p. 2 8 - 3 0 . 
9 4 "Syria reaps rewards of regional policies", MEED. 2 7 . 0 9 . 1 9 9 1 , p. 5 . 
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Jordan took sides with Iraq, while Syria supported Iran. In 1985, however, Syria and 
Jordan - under Saudi pressure - moved towards a rapprochement.96 
3.4.2 Rapprochement with Egypt 
Relations between Egypt and Syria - also interrupted after the signing of the Camp David 
Accords - were only restored in December 1989. This evolution had been initiated by 
Egypt's unconditional readmission to the Arab League at the 1989 Casablanca summit, that 
Syria also officially sanctioned.97 Syria wished to improve its relations with Egypt for 
three main reasons: firstly, Syria wished to protect itself against the threatening behaviour 
of Saddam Hussain after the end of the Iran-Iraq war; secondly, it wanted to fmd 
compensation for its reduced link with the Soviet Union; lastly, Asad hoped to improve 
Syria's bargaining position for peace as renewed relations with Egypt, which implied an 
acceptance of Egypt's recognition of Israel's right to exist, could lead to a detente in his 
relations with the United States.98 
3.4.3 Impact of the international environment 
By 1987 it had become clear that the developments within the Soviet Union and 
Gorbachev's policies of perestoika and glasnost would have repercussions for the 
formulation of policy towards the Middle East. Indeed, the decline of East-West rivalry 
reduced Syria's strategic importance to the USSR and even led to an improvement of 
Soviet relations with Israel. 
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"The climate, both worldwide and in the Middle East has changed signifi-
cantly. The antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States in 
that region has ended. This alone is a factor that affects all the elements of 
the Middle East equation. It is no longer what it once was."" 
Due to the challenge of a changing World Order, Asad needed to reorientate his strategy. 
He continued to strive for strategic parity with Israel, whilst combining his effort to break 
away from his isolation within the Arab world with the achievement of a rapprochement 
with the West, especially with the United States. Asad calculated that another alternation 
in strategy was essential to restore the possibility for peace negotiations in the future. 
"The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the superpower rivalry appeared 
to render Syria's strategy of tactical rejectionism unviable and left no check 
on Israeli power projection...Asad believed that Syria could not wage a war 
without the Soviet Union and could not achieve peace without the United 
States. " m 
3.4.4 Relations with the United States and the West 
Despite Syria's incremental disengagement with the Soviet Union after 1987, its relations 
with the United States improved at a slow pace because of two reasons: 
Primarily, Syria and the United States had fundamentally different plans for the Middle 
East region. Syria wanted to establish an international conference with PLO and Soviet 
participation, and negotiations on the basis of UN resolution 242. While purely bilateral 
issues could be discussed between the concerned parties, comprehensive issues had to be 
SHEVERNADZE, E., The Future Belongs to Freedom, London, Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991, p. 108. 
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dealt with collectively by the Arab participants. In return for a just settlement, a full peace 
was possible.101 Before the Gulf War, the Reagan administration, supported Arab-Israeli 
peace negotiations, but concentrated on fostering a bilateral Palestinian-Israeli dialogue, 
excluding the Soviet Union from the peace process and ignoring Syrian interests in an 
attempt to peripheralise both states. The American peace initiative collapsed altogether.102 
A second obstacle to an improvement in US-Syrian relations were the policies conducted 
by Asad's minority regime. Syria's reputation as a sponsor of terrorist activities severely 
undermined its relations with the West. A further impediment for closer relations with the 
West were the hostages retained in Lebanon. The US expected that Asad would use his 
influence with the Shi'ites in Lebanon to plead for the release of these hostages. Asad was 
reluctant to do so, but finally in April 1990 - as a result of Asad's interference - the first 
American hostage was released.103 
3.5 T H E PALESTINIANS IN L E B A N O N : A C A S E STUDY I L L U S T R A T I N G T A C T I C A L 
F L E X I B I L I T Y 
In this section, the author intends to assess the motivation behind Asad's policies towards 
the Palestinians in Lebanon. The case study will illustrate how Asad, enjoying relative 
autonomy, was able to pursue rationally calculated policies with tactical flexibility. 
Although there appears to be a lack of coherence in Syria's policies in Lebanon, it is 
possible to distinguish a certain logic and consistency in these policies, provided that they 
are put into the context of Syria's strategy in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 1 0 4 
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At the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, Israel warned Syria not to intervene on 
behalf of the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestinians. Asad took this warning 
seriously as he did not want to engage in a direct war with Israel.105 Asad further hesitated 
to intervene because he wished to maintain the status-quo: on the one hand, Asad wanted 
to avert the possibility of the Maronites partitioning Lebanon; on the other hand, Asad 
wished to avoid the establishment of a radical regime in Lebanon by the National 
Movement and the Palestinians.106 In both cases, Syria's national security and the regime's 
survival would be in danger. 
In an attempt to maintain a balance between the opposing parties in Lebanon, Asad, in 
1976, intervened on behalf of the Christians for which venture he managed to get US and 
Israeli approval. This intervention was heavily criticised both within Syria and in the Arab 
world. 
"Since 1917, no regime in Syria, whatever its colouring, had taken an anti-
Palestinian stand. It was a policy without precedent and alienated wide 
segments of Syrian opinion. ",0? 
Asad, however, calculated that the dangers involved by not intervening in Lebanon 
outweighed the risk of a temporary decline in the regime's pan-Arab credentials and 
legitimacy. Indeed, with his intervention, Asad was able to avert a Christian defeat, which 
would have led to an Israeli intervention. Moreover, by intervening, Asad prevented the 
establishment of a radicalised Lebanon that could have provided a fertile base for 
opposition against the Syrian regime.108 Asad was also bidding to establish Syria as the 
arbiter of Lebanon and to acquire the "Lebanese card" for use in Arab-Israeli negotiations. 
1 0 5 CHALALA, E., "Syrian Policy in Lebanon, 1976-1984: Moderate Goals and Pragmatic Means", 
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By pacifying Lebanon, Asad was sending a message to Washington that Syria could be a 
force for regional stability i f its interests in a comprehensive peace were not ignored. 
In the 1976 crisis, Asad acted with relative autonomy. However, he could not fully ignore 
the rising discontent within Syria. Therefore, in an attempt to justify his tactical flexibility 
and to maintain his regime legitimacy, Asad portrayed his actions as being in the interests 
of the Arab nationalist struggle against Israel. Indeed, if Israel was to gain control in 
Lebanon, a comprehensive solution based upon UN resolution 242 would appear less 
likely as Israel would negotiate from a position of strength. 
From 1978 onwards, Asad gradually changed alliances. This shift away from the 
Christian-Rightists was necessary to outmanoeuver their attempt to establish a Maronite 
mini-state with the help of Israel. Moreover, after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and 
after the failure in the Geneva Conference of 1977 to find a comprehensive solution to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, an alliance with the PLO seemed more beneficial. Accommodating 
the United States and Israel, by supporting the Maronites in Lebanon, had failed to deliver 
an environment for a potential comprehensive settlement; consequently, this policy lost its 
diplomatic value.109 Asad, therefore, calculated that i f Syria could establish an agreement 
with the PLO to jointly negotiate the future of the West Bank and the Golan Heights, its 
bargairiing power would increase, whilst the source of domestic discontent would be 
relieved. According to Hinnebusch110, Syria's ability to "play the Palestinian card", would 
enable it to obstruct any attempt to settle the Palestinian issue without Syria. In return, 
Syria promised the Palestinians that it would not sign a peace agreement without an 
acceptable settlement for the Palestinians. In the meanwhile, Asad refrained from opposing 
the Christians too openly in order to avoid a full scale war with Israel. Despite this 
caution, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. 
1 0 9 CHALALA, E , Lc,, p. 76. 
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Asad, at first, abstained from intervening, fearing a major confrontation with Israel and 
hoping the invasion would only be of a limited scope. Realising this was not the case, 
Syria fought back. However, due to heavy losses and the success of Israel's drive 
northward in the Beka'a valley, which threatened Syria's western flank, Asad accepted a 
cease-fire, whilst the PLO was still engaged in battle. This incident re-opened old wounds 
in Syrian-Palestinian relations as the PLO began to doubt the efficacy of its strategic 
alliance with Damascus.111 Although, Syria's position in Lebanon had deteriorated and 
despite Arafat's belittling of the strategic alliance with Syria, Damascus attempted to 
present the situation in a positive light. It justified its losses by asserting that it had 
managed to frustrate the Israeli campaign in Lebanon without assistance, and despite 
Israel's overwhelming superiority on the ground.112 Damascus needed this justification in 
order to appease opposition within Syria. 
Following the ceasefire in June 1982, Asad faced the challenge of obstructing US efforts 
to establish a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement along the lines of the Reagan plan. 
The Reagan plan, was an attempt to establish a separate Israeli-Jordanian peace over the 
West Bank, but without PLO approval, it was not likely to gain momentum. Arafat, 
however, in an attempt to counter his dependency upon Syria and seeking to maintain his 
autonomy, entered into negotiations with King Hussayn on the possibility of the latter 
representing the PLO in negotiations with Israel over the West Bank.1 1 3 In response to 
these developments, Asad started to undermine Arafat's position, first by restricting the 
movements of al-Fatah members in northern Lebanon and the Beq'a, later by supporting 
the pro-Syrian constituent organisations of the PLO against Arafat's intentions.114 This 
resulted in the rejection of the Palestinian involvement in the Reagan plan by the Palestine 
National Council in February 1983. 
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Damascus, however, did not restrict its interference in Palestinian affairs to the Reagan 
plan. When by June 1983, a rebellion from within al-Fatah, headed by Abu Musa, erupted 
against Arafat's authority, Syria supported the revolt, hoping that the man that had become 
the obstacle to Syrian control of the PLO would be removed.115 The Syrian backed 
rebellion led to the retreat of the PLO from Tripoli and a month later the evacuation of the 
PLO forces from Lebanon; Arafat, however, was not replaced. 
The outcome of Asad's conflict with the PLO contained a number of bitter ambiguities. By 
driving the PLO out of Lebanon and, due to Asad's personal feud with Arafat, Asad failed 
to acquire control over the "Palestinian card". Syria's need to prioritise its own security 
and political interest, whilst attempting to dictate Palestinian policies proved to be counter-
productive and resulted in an Egyptian-Jordanian-PLO axis.116 Asad also failed to force 
Israel and the United States to include Syria in a comprehensive peace settlement. Asad, 
however, did manage to obstruct efforts to draw Jordan and the PLO into separate 
agreements that excluded Syria. Therefore, one can conclude that Asad, despite his tactical 
deviations from the conventional notions of Arab nationalism, especially in his interventi-
on against the Palestinians, has remained consistent in the pursuit of his goal to achieve a 
comprehensive peace based upon UN resolution 242. 
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CHAPTER 4 : 1990-1994: THE OMNIBALANCER I I ADAPTING TO 
A NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
In this chapter, the author intends to portray, how Asad, between January 1990 and July 
1994, adapted to the changing international environment. The author of this paper intends 
to examine the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War on both 
Syria's internal sphere and its foreign policy. 
Although Asad seemingly deviated from Arab nationalist norms, adapting his tactics to the 
realities of the New World Order, until this date, he had not lost sight of his goal to 
accomplish a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict based upon UN 
resolution 242. Increasingly, however, Asad attempted to shift the regime's legitimacy 
away from ideological legitimacy based on Arab nationalism to legal/rational legitimacy. 
The result is a combination of both types of legitimacy. 
Within Syria, selective liberalisation continues, whilst political decompression is carefully 
introduced in order to enhance the regime's legal/rational legitimacy and to increase its 
longevity. Externally, the pursuance of separate deals between the PLO and Israel in 
September 1993 and between Jordan and Israel in July 1994, have given Syria more room 
to manoeuver. Although the Syrian regime continues to adhere to a comprehensive peace, 
it has now been given the opportunity to settle for a separate peace with Israel over the 
Golan without losing its Arab nationalist credentials. Whilst considering other potential 
directions for Syria's foreign policy, the author will refrain from engaging in speculative 
dialogue. 
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4.1 L I B E R A L I S A T I O N MEASURES 
A major step towards liberalising the Syrian economy took place in May 1991, when Asad 
signed the Legislative law No. 10.1 1 7 Investment law No. 10 was designed to encourage 
Syrians, expatriates, Arab and foreign investors to invest in foreign currency in any sector 
of the Syrian economy, except tourism.118 The only restrictions were that the value of the 
project had to be at least 10 million LS, and that investors had to rely as much as possible 
on Syrian labour and resources.119 Moreover, each project had to be accepted by the Syrian 
Higher Council for Investments, which had to give its permission or rejection within 60 
days.120 
The main purpose of law No. 10 was to keep money in Syria, whilst also attempting to 
attract Syrian money held abroad back into the country.121 This purpose was only partially 
successful. Although capital has been invested in trade and services, there seems to be a 
reluctance and a lack of confidence to invest in long term projects. The main objections of 
investors are fear of post-Asad instability and corruption.122 Therefore, unless other 
reforms such as the unification of the exchange rate, the establishment of a stock market 
or banking reforms, are introduced, law No. 10 may have reached its limits. 1 2 3 
Although the 1990s have brought further economic liberalisation, these policies continue to 
be shaped by the political rationale of maximising regime autonomy rather than the logic 
1 1 7 "Investment law comes into force", MEED, 17.05.1991. 
1 1 8 AFFAKI, B.G., "La Loi No. 10 sur la Promotion des Investissements: Une Nouvelle Donne sur le 
Marche Syrien", Revue de Droit des Affaires Internationales, 1992, No. 4, p. 385. 
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Review, January 1992, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 36. 
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of economic rationality, per se. Indeed, if one relies on the economic rationale to explain 
Syria's liberalisation process and considers it as a crisis-generated policy, one cannot 
explain why the process has not been abandonned when the general economic situation 
was improving at the end of the 1980s or after Gulf Arab aid had allowed a further 
recovery of the Syrian economy after the Gulf War. Indeed, by the time law No. 10 had 
been introduced, the severe economic crisis of the 1980s had already been solved by aid, 
oil-revenues and good harvests.124 Therefore, some believe that Asad's further liberalisation 
measures were inspired by the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Asad realised that in order to avoid Syria's isolation in the New World Order and to 
ensure stability within Syria on the long run, he had to gradually move towards a market 
economy.125 Hence, whilst continuing to play off different sections of the bourgeoisie, 
Asad increasingly allows them to cover the gaps left by the decline of etatism.126 Asad, 
however, in order to eshew instability in the short run and out of fear of what happened in 
Russia and Egypt, choses to introduce liberalisation incrementally and in a selective 
way. 1 2 7 Hence, in order to avoid the Soviet outcome, a strong state is imperative to 
deliberate over liberalisation. Muhammed Imadi, Minister of Economy and the main 
architect behind economic liberalisation in Syria, forsees a state regulated market economy 
with some state intervention and a reduced public sector forced to run on a profit making 
basis.128 In this case, the public sector would receive less subsidies and would have to 
compete with the private sector. Whilst some public sector companies may be able to 
compete, others may go out of business.129 
1 2 4 Western diplomat, Damascus, July 1994. 
1 2 5 Western diplomat, Damascus, July 1994. 
1 2 8 HINNEBUSCH, R.A., "Asad's Syria and the New World Order: The Struggle for Regime Survival", 
Middle East Policy Council, May/June 1993, No. 9, p. 5. 
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1 2 8 Interview with M. Imadi, Minister of Economy, Damascus, July 1994. 
1 2 9 Syrian businessman, Damascus, July 1994. 
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4.2 P O L I T I C A L DECOMPRESSION 
Only after the 1980s, it is possible to detect a limited form of political decompression130 
under the auspices of a corporatist state, which since 1990 included part of the private 
sector in the political arena, albeit only at a consultative level. It is apparent that the 
regime elite only restructures its political base to stabilise its regime and to consolidate its 
legal/rational legitimacy. 
Syria's major political reform occured in May 1990, when a new Parliament was elected. 
With the acceptance of a greater amount of independent candidates, the regime incorpora-
ted into its structures private sector businessmen, independent intellectuals and traditional 
leaders, thereby partly adjusting to changing socio-economic conditions.131 Although 
Parliament is only a quasi-corporatist body invested with consultative powers, and is not 
meant to function as a counterweight to government,132 this reform is another attempt by 
the regime to broaden its base beyond the Ba'th party. It can be interpreted as an indicator 
of the further erosion and marginalisation of the Ba'th Party as the central force behind the 
body politic. An illustration of this downgrading of the Ba'th party can be located in the 
fact that no party congress has been held since 1985.133 Some believe that Asad does not 
appear before a party congress because he is angered by the party's criticism on his 
tactical flexibility in his foreign policy decision-making. It has been suggested by some 
pundits that Asad wil l not confront the congress until securing results in the peace 
process.134 
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Not many pressures from the bourgeoisie for democratisation are likely to emerge as they 
fear that the inherent inequalities of capitalism may heighten popular discontent and open 
the way to Islamic fundamentalism as it did in Algeria.1 3 5 The coopted segments of the 
bourgeoisie seem prepared not to demand further political reforms in return for business 
freedom and security; whilst the remaining parts of the bourgeoisie lack the bargaining 
power.136 
For the moment, Asad's political decompression seems to be sufficient and there seems to 
be no reason for Asad to introduce major changes in his established corporatist state. In 
March 1992, a correspondent from the the Saudi daily Asharq al-Aswat commented: 
"The main feature of the current stage in Syria is political and economic 
stability. There is no need for radical changes in these two areas.1,137 
Poelling, however, in a Workshop at the University of Exeter in March 1994, suggested 
that Asad was considering to coopt segments of the business community into his cabinet. 
If this is the case, it would imply a further incremental step in the broadening of Asad's 
political basis. 
4.3 T H E G U L F W A R AND N E W OPPORTUNITIES 
4.3.1 The Gulf War coalition 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 opened new opportunities for Syria and the 
Middle East peace process. 
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Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Gulf states, 
Egypt and Syria assembled and issued a statement condemning Iraq's actions. In the 
meeting it was decided that a united Arab army would not be established, and therefore 
Kuwait and Saudi-Arabia called upon the United States for military support. Against all 
expectations, Syria decided to join the coalition force against Iraq, even mobilising 20,000 
troops to Saudi Arabia.138 As an Iranian commentator remarked: 
"The Syrian stance is a bit surprising. Regardless of its serious economic 
difficulties, the leadership in Damascus seems to be entering a camp that 
for years wanted to topple the rule of president Hafiz al-Asad because of 
his progressive policies and hostility towards the Zionist regime.1,139 
In an attempt, however, to placate domestic opinion, Syria claimed it would change sides 
if Israel would get involved in the conflict. Moreover, Syria demanded that once the inter-
Arab crisis was resolved, the foreign forces would withdraw from the region. This allowed 
Asad to justify his move within Syria as an effort to ensure that the Gulf Arab states 
would not assume that they could only dependent for their security upon international 
forces. According to Asad, it was therefore the duty of the Arab states to participate in the 
Gulf War coalition in order to prevent a permanent Western occupation of the Arab Gulf 
after the crisis.1 4 0 
The reasons behind Syria's decision to oppose Iraq during the Gulf War, rather than taking 
a neutral stand or supporting it, can be explained in a number of ways: 
Asad's decision to join the Gulf coalition was largely motivated by his strategy in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Asad condemned Iraq because its invasion of Kuwait caused a 
YORKE, V., "Prospects for peace: the Syrian Dimension", MB, No. 414, 06.12.1991, p. 16. 
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diversion of Arab attention and resources from the Arab-Israeli conflict. 1 4 1 Realising that 
Saddam Hussein's ambitions could not be contained through a pan-Arab effort, Asad began 
to recognise the advantages of a Syrian alliance with the US-led coalition. Asad 
calculated that supporting the Gulf War coalition would present opportunities for Syria to 
globally realign itself and thus provide sufficient momentum to enhance the possibility for 
a resolution of the Israeli occupation of the territories.142 Indeed, EEC economic sanctions 
against Syria were lifted and diplomatic relations with Britain restored.143 From the United 
States, Syria gained the promise of an international conference in which a solution of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict would be pursued on the basis of UN resolutions 242 and 338.144 
A second advantage resulting from Syria's alliance with the coalition was the opportunity 
it provided for Syria to situate itself at the centre of an Arab security system. This, 
however, was only possible if Syria did not remain neutral in the conflict. The possibility 
of the establishment of a common security policy between the GCC states, Egypt and 
Syria also provides an explanation of Syria's decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia as 
otherwise a Syrian role in the proposed Damascus Declaration would not be credible.145 
Linked with Asad's second motivation to join the coalition, a third advantage resulted from 
his policies. In return for sending troops, Saudi-Arabia and the oil-rich Gulf Arab states 
agreed to compensate Syria up to $2bn. Today, the original $2bn appears to have been 
only a first payment. $4bn a year, totalling $13bn, has since been given to Syria.146 This 
allowed Syria the possibility to address its adverse economy and to rejuvenate its attempt 
to attain "strategic parity" with Israel. This doctrine had to a large extent been abandonned 
1 4 1 "Syrian president offers to send more troops to Gulf if requested", SWB, 14.09.1990. 
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after 1987, due to sharply reduced Soviet support.147 The renewed attention to "strategic 
parity" and the deterrent effect of a modernising Syrian military, would considerably 
increase Syria's weight in potential settlements after the Gulf War. 
A fourth reason convincing Asad to support the Gulf War coalition, stemmed from the 
changes in the international environment and the emergence of the New World Order. The 
breakdown of the bipolar world had caused the disappearance of the Soviet Union as 
Syria's protector and arms supplier. Hence, Syria was no longer capable of exploiting 
superpower rivalry in the Arab-Isareli conflict. Therefore, if Asad wished to avoid 
becoming the next victim in the New World Order, he had to adapt his strategy by re-
aligning with the United States, which held the key to a diplomatic settlement. 
A final gain for Asad was the green light from France and the United States to promote 
order in Lebanon.148 This permitted Syria to launch an offensive against General Aoun, 
without fear of international recriminations. For months, Syria and Iraq had clashed 
through their proxies in Lebanon, but neither of the parties succeeded in securing victory. 
In October 1990, however, Iraq could no longer sustain its financial and military support 
of Aoun. 
One can conclude from this Gulf War episode that Syria deviated from its former pan-
Arab agenda. Asad amended his strategy, but not at the expense of his pan-Arab 
objectives. 
Once again, Asad had put his domestic support on the line in the short run in order to 
conduct his pragmatic policies. In pursuing his objectives, Asad enjoyed only relative 
autonomy. In order to limit the damage in regime legitimacy, Asad had to justify his 
foreign policy decision-making within Syria as being ultimately beneficial for the struggle 
with Israel. 
1 4 7 ZIARATI, M., "The Regional Balance of Power in the Air", MEI, 19.11.1993, p. 21. 
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4.3.2 New opportunities 
In July 1991, Syria accepted an invitation to join an American peace initiative. Asad, 
however, had to compromise on the structural organisation of the peace talks and by doing 
so, complied to all of Israel's demands.149 Nevertheless, in an interview, Asad explained 
that he accepted the Bush proposals, because he noticed a greater seriousness by the 
United States to advance peace than before150 and furthermore, because the proposals were 
based upon UN resolutions 242 and 338.151 
An international peace conference was established within the framework of a comprehensi-
ve and bilateral formula. The conference would convene under the auspices of the United 
States and the Soviet Union, to set an agenda for the comprehensive and bilateral 
components of the talks.1 5 2 Afterwards, direct negotiations would take place within a loose 
framework, with no coercive authority whatsoever. The Palestinians would only participate 
as part of a joint delegation with the Jordanians.153 Although the PLO was not directly 
represented, Asad commented: 
Everything will be done in agreement with the Palestinians, and nothing 
will be done in isolation from them ".154 
Asad's compromise was necessary if he wanted to achieve a solution for the Palestinian-
Arab problem. However, this pragmatic approach does not imply a change in his pan-Arab 
objectives, as the peace talks were still based upon the UN resolutions 242 and 338. 
Tactically, it was expedient to accept bilateral negotiations considering the new regional 
1 4 9 BARAM, H., "A jubilant Shamir gets what he wanted", MEL No. 405, 26.07.1991, p. 3. 
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environment, the emerging New World Order, and the international momentum after the 
Gulf War to settle the conflict. 1 5 5 
"One of the reasons for Asad's procedural turn-about was the recognition 
that, with no Soviet superpower to turn to and the regional balance shifted 
in favour of the pro-Western Arab states, Syria had more to gain by playing 
along with rather than obstructing the US-brokered peace-process. ">56 
In October 1991, the peace conference convened in Madrid. Both Israel and Arab demands 
seemed irreconcilable. During the first six months, the peace initiative seemed to be in a 
deadlock for all parties concerned. There was a large gap between the position of Syria 
and Israel: Israel declared the Golan non-negotiatable and Syria reaffirmed that it would 
not make peace without Israel's complete withdrawal from the Golan. 
Things slowly improved after the installment of a new goverment in Israel. Officially, 
Syria persisted in its demand for the Golan's complete evacuation. Unofficially and under 
increased pressure from the United States to be more conciliatory towards the new Rabin 
government, Syria held the line that i f its sovereignty over the whole Golan were to be 
recognised then territorial compromises, i.e. demilitarised zones or UN forces, would be 
acceptable. The announced position of Rabin on the Golan was perceived not to be that 
different, so that the gap in the divergence of opinions between Syria and Israel - at least 
unofficially - narrowed.157 Officially, however, the Israeli Knesset had reaffirmed its 
rejection of making the Golan Heights negotiatable.158 
In the sixth round of talks, Rabin suggested that Syria could always make a separate deal 
with Israel. This would give Israel the advantage that its main threat - Syria - would be 
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neutralised. Syria, however, remained consistent with its pan-Arab objectives replying that 
an Arab settlement with Israel should be comprehensive and exclude separate bilateral 
peace treaties. Moreover, i f Syria would have agreed to negotiate outside the Madrid 
formula in secret side channels, it would have lost all legal recourse to the UN resolutions 
on which the conference bases the negotiations.159 
"Syria was now asked by Israel to do exactly what Damascus had been 
asking the other Arab government not to do. "16° 
Syria remained resolute in its conviction to enter any peace talks through a multi-lateral 
medium. Syria's resilience was rewarded with a US-sponsored concession from Israel. 
Rabin stated: 
"/ believe that the government that I serve as a prime minister is the first 
government that accepted the principle of Resolutions 242 and 338, as 
being applicable to the achievement of peace. No government in the past 
did so. Which shows that we understand that peace compromises have to be 
made by both sides. "m 
An unexpected break-through occured in September 1993, when the PLO and Israel 
announced they had been conducting secret talks for eight months. On 13 September, they 
took the first official steps to recognising each other. The "Gaza and Jericho first plan" 
was drawn up. 1 6 2 This agreement was formalised in Washington between Arafat, Rabin 
and Clinton. 
1 9 "Al-Hayat: the Syrian peace-talks strategy", Mid East Mirror. 31.10.1991, p. 25. 
1 8 0 JANSEN, G„ "Syria's bottom line", MB, No. 434, 25.09.1992, p. 5. 
1 6 1 NEFF, D., "Clinton, Rabin and a deal with Syria", MIL No. 446, 19.03.1993, p. 3. 
1 8 2 BUTT, G., "The deal that could change the Middle East", MB, No. 458, 10.10.1993, p. 3 
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Syria had always dismissed the idea of a separate peace between itself and Israel on the 
basis that only a comprehensive pan-Arab settlement was acceptable. Syria further opposed 
the Oslo agreement as it did not address any of the Palestinian substantive issues such as 
the end of the occupation, the return for the refugees or Arab right to Jerusalem.163 The 
Oslo agreement transformed the Palestinian cause from a matter of national rights to one 
of administration over 300 square kilometer, whilst relieving Israel from international 
pressure for withdrawal of the territories.164 Therefore, Syria did not conceal its displeasure 
towards the PLO. In refusing to endorse the agreement, but not rejecting it, Asad distanced 
himself from the Oslo agreement. 
"Asad was clearly not convinced of the wisdom of what Arafat was doing, 
and was not prepared to be associated with the plan in case it eventually 
fell apart. ",65 
Syria maintained its position and continued to stress that the Arab occupied territories 
should be returned according to the terms of the UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 
338 and 425. Moreover, Syria stressed that the rights of the Palestinians would remain a 
top priority despite the policies of the PLO leadership.166 American, Israeli and PLO hopes 
were rebuffed as Syria remained resolute to its convictions.167 Asad was determined to 
stand firm as long as possible in order to reach an agreement with Israel on the best 
possible terms. In the meanwhile, Syria waited for Israel or the United States to move 
towards its terms. 
The main point of contention between Israel and Syria stemmed from the fact that Syria 
wants the total evacuation of the occupied Golan for total peace within a time span of two 
"Syrian press continues its assault on the agreement", Mid East Mirror, 1 4 . 1 0 . 1 9 9 3 , p. 1 5 . 
"Syrian press denounces Arafat faction as 'ally of Israel'", MidEast Mirror. 2 3 . 1 1 . 1 9 9 3 , p. 1 0 . 
BUTT, G., "The deal that could change the Middle East", MEL No. 4 5 8 , 1 0 . 1 0 . 1 9 9 3 , p. 3 . 
"Khaddam: the trap Arafat walked into", MidEast Mirror, 1 6 . 1 1 . 1 9 9 3 , p. 1 0 . 
BUTT, G., "Asad plays for time", MB, No. 4 5 9 , 2 4 . 1 0 . 1 9 9 3 , p. 6 - 7 . 
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years, whereas Israel believes in a withdrawal from the Golan phased over 5 to 10 years. 
In the meanwhile, Israel could not reach agreements with its other Arab neighbours, as 
Lebanon cannot do anything that Syria doesn't want and Jordan, at that time, still claimed 
it would negotiate, but not sign any agreements before Syria did. 1 6 8 
In December 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, succeeded in convincing Asad 
to resume negotiations mid-January 1994. In return for Asad's goodwill, the United States 
promised Asad a summit in Geneva in January and started to lift its trade restrictions on 
Syria.1 5 9 Asad agreed with the American proposal, knowing that his meeting with Clinton 
would commence before the date set for the negotiations with Israel. He could gauge 
Clinton's seriousness for peace in the Middle East and his willingness to pressure Israel.170 
Asad and Clinton met in Geneva on 16 January 1994. After their summit they expressed 
their hopes for a break-through in the search for a comprehensive peace between Israel 
and its Arab neighbours. Asad explained his perception of peace in the region as follows: 
"I see peace with Israel as a strategic choice to secure Arab rights, which 
enables all peoples in the region to live in security. 
Asad further expressed his will to achieve peace: 
"In honour we fought, in honour we negotiate, in honour we shall make 
peace. We want an honourable peace...for the hundreds of thousands who 
sacrificed their lives in defense of their nation... We want the peace of the 
brave, real peace that endures, guarantees the rights of all...If the leaders 
1 8 8 "Syria catches the peace train", MEED. 21.01.1994, p. 2. 
1 8 9 NEFF, D„ "Syria: The United States and Syria", MM. No. 465, 17.12.1993, p. 8-9. 
1 7 0 JANSEN, G., "Syria: A meeting is arranged", MEL No. 465, 17.12.1993, p. 9. 
1 7 1 "Asad adds his weight to Middle East peace talks", The Independent. 17.01.1991, p. 1. 
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of Israel have enough courage to respond...a new age of security, stability 
and normal peacefid relations will dawn in the region.1,172 
Asad's statements underlined the fact that Syria's line spelled out at the start of the peace 
process in Madrid and, indeed, since Asad's rise to power, had remained unchanged. 
A major achievement for Asad, was the fact itself that he had a summit with the American 
President. It indicated Washington's willingness to endorse the rehabilitation of a country 
it had long condemned.173 Clinton stressed this change in American policy by asserting 
that: 
"Syria is a key country in the achievement of a comprehensive peace."'74 
This statement provided Asad with a recognition of Syria's role that he had been pursuing 
for a long time. 
When, on 25 July 1994, Jordan and Israel signed a bilateral pact in Washington175, Syria 
was confronted with another development which could undermine its aim to be the key 
country in the provision of a comprehensive peace settlement. Jordan, however, fearing a 
fierce Syrian reaction, did not sign a ful l peace treaty, rather a pact of nonbelligerency 
paving the way for a peace treaty at a later date.175 The pact includes Israeli-Jordanian 
agreements on two new border crossings, free passage for tourists, a highway across the 
1 7 2 "MidEast breakthrough: Syrian President offers Israel 'normal peaceful relations'", Mid East Mirror, 
17.01.1994, p. 4. 
1 7 3 BUTT, G., "Syria: Asad gains maximum benefits for minimal concessions", MEI. No. 467, 
21.01.1994, p. 3-4. 
1 7 4 "Asad adds weight to Middle East peace talks", The Independent. 17.01.1994, p. 1. 
1 7 5 "Rabin et Hussein se retrouvent en paix", La Libre Belaiaue. 26.07.1994, p. 4. 
1 7 8 "M. Rabin et le roi Hussein ont mis fin a I'etat de guerre entre leurs deux pays", Le Monde. 
27.07.1994, p. 3. 
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Jordan and economic development of the Jordan valley.1 7 7 However, similar to the PLO-
Israeli treaty of Autumn last year, the main critical questions such as the Palestinian 
refugees who arrived in Jordan in 1948, the future of Jerusalem and the disputed water 
rights in the Jordan valley, remain unsolved.178 
Surprisingly, Asad's reaction was tempered, whilst offering criticism to the government 
controlled press in Syria remained somewhat limited. Instead, neutral coverage of the 
Washington summit, including Rabin's speech, was given both in the newspapers and on 
Syrian state television.179 This fact is perceived to be a sign of goodwill towards Israel by 
the Syrian regime, and a way of preparing public opinion for a potential Syrian-Israeli 
deal in the future. 1 8 0 Asad's defused reaction may also have been caused out of fear to put 
his cordial relations with the United States on the line, whilst US engagement in the peace 
process is vital if Syria wants to avoid being isolated. President Clinton, however, had 
telephoned Asad to reassure him of the American view that Syria is still the key to a 
Middle Eastern peace.181 
The Oslo agreement and the Jordanian-Israeli pact could have major effects on Syria's 
foreign policy decision-making. Before the PLO went its own way, Asad would not have 
been able to settle for less than a comprehensive UN 242 settlement, without depriving the 
Syrian regime from its nationalist legitimacy.182 Today, however, as the PLO and Jordan 
concluded their separate deals, Syrian nationalism seems to be ascending at the expense of 
the Arab nationalist dreams, which are no longer considered to be realistic.183 Asad is 
1 7 7 "Door opens to Israel-Jordan peace treaty", The Independent. 26.07.1994, p. 20. 
1 7 8 "Israel and Jordan end 46-year conflict", The Independent, 26.07.1994, p. 1. 
1 7 9 "La carte de la Syrie", Le Monde. 10.08.1994, p. 1. 
1 8 0 'Will Syria make it four?", The Economist. 30.07.1994, p. 35. 
1 6 1 'Will Syria make it four?", The Economist. 30.07.1994, p. 35. 
1 8 2 HINNEBUSCH, R.A., "Syrian Foreign Policy and the Peace Process", Unpublished Paper. 
University of Durham, n.d., p. 6. 
1 8 3 informant, Damascus, July 1994. 
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respected for not being deferent to the West as King Hussayn is. As the regime's 
legitimacy gradually shifts away from Arab nationalism and ideology towards more 
legal/rational legitimacy based on internal liberalisation, stability and prosperity, the 
regime will no longer be discredited if a settlement for the Golan is the maximum 
outcome.184 Although there exists a general feeling of disappointment over the failure of 
the Arabs to maintain a common front, today, i f the regime completes a separate deal with 
Israel over the Golan, it could still be perceived as having been consistent in its policy 
objectives.185 Asad, however, seems in no hurry to follow the formula used with the 
Palestinians and the Jordanians. Officially, Syria maintains its position of wanting Israel's 
acceptance of full withdrawal from the Golan and its recognition of full Syrian 
sovereignty over that area. Only then, will Syria be prepared to end its state of war and be 
willing to establish normal relations with Israel. Israel from its side, demands Syria's 
ensurance for normalisation as a condition for further negotiations. Since May 1994, 
however, Syrian and Israeli views behind the scenes have grown closer. 
At the beginning of May, Mr Christopher carried a paper to Damascus containing Israel's 
ideas about how to meet Syria's demands. Although Syria rejected the proposal, it 
formulated an alternative set of ideas.186 Mr Christopher's consequent shuttles to the region 
seem to have been designed to finesse the two papers into an agreement.187 These 
developments have not been impeded by the Jordanian-Israeli pact. Warren Christopher 
left the region early in August and claimed to come back for a next round in September. 
He commented that Syria needed some time to digest several Israeli suggestions, but 
refused to give any further details.188 
Informant, Damascus, July 1994. 
1 8 5 Informant, Damascus, July 1994. 
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At this stage, attempting to discuss Asad's strategy any further would accumulate into pure 
speculation. However, whether Asad makes a seperate deal on the Golan or whether he 
will continue to wait and see what happens with the PLO and Jordan's separate tracks, in 
each of these scenarios he will have remained consistent with his original goals. In any of 
these cases, Asad's position both within Syria and in the region can be perceived as the 
result of his ability to balance between his foreign policy objectives and his regime 
legitimacy, whilst adjusting to the new conditions enforced on him. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout this dissertation it has been the contention of the author that Syrian foreign 
policy decision-making, between 1970 and 1994, has been shaped by mainly two 
determinants: (i) the Arab nationalist struggle against Israel, and (ii) the preservation of 
regime legitimacy. 
In chapter one, the argument has been advanced that for Third World states which face an 
external security threat, the Omnibalancing I I model appears to be the most viable 
theoretical framework to examine and understand the roots and dimensions of the foreign 
policy decision-making process. Moreover, it has been suggested that regimes facing 
external threats are more likely to transfer the basis of their legitimacy from one largely 
based upon ideological or neo-patrimonial concerns into legal/rational legitimacy. In 
chapters two, three and four, the validity of the omnibalancing I I model and the legitimacy 
concepts have been explored and applied to the Syrian case. 
The aim of chapter two, was to convey how a leader internally consolidates his state in 
order to ensure his legitimacy and the survival of the regime, but equally to be able to 
conduct a foreign policy with relative autonomy. In Syria, President Hafiz al-Asad, after 
seizing power in November 1970 and motivated by a political rationale, set about creating 
a quasi-corporatist state structure whilst attempting to broaden the regime's social base. 
One can chart the course of Asad's changing base through identifying the transitions 
within the corporatist structures of the state. The public sector represented the main 
partner of the state in the early 1970s, their role has been superceded by a bourgeois 
contigent, since in the mid-1980s. Asad, through policies of economic liberalisation and 
political restructuring, coopted new elements into the regime's domestic constituency 
without, as yet, expelling his original supporters. This policy was accompanied by a 
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gradual shift from ideological legitimacy towards a combination of neo-patrimoni-
al/ideological legitimacy. It enhanced Asad's ability to balance above society and enabled 
him to preserve the autonomy to pursue his foreign policies relatively unconstrained by 
domestic opposition. 
Chapter three concentrated upon the external aspect of Syria's policies, between 1970 and 
1990, and examined how Asad since his seizure of power in 1970 remained consistent in 
the pursuance of his redefined pan-Arab goal. He pursued an "honourable" settlement of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which peace with Israel could only be achieved if it withdrew 
from the lands conquered in 1967. Although Asad's main objective remained consistent, 
his position of relative autonomy from domestic constraints allowed him a deviation in the 
use of strategy and tactics when attempting to maximise his power in the regional 
environment. Whilst sometimes violating the Arab nationalist norms with his pragmatic 
foreign policy decision-making, as illustrated with his conflict with the Palestinians, Asad 
always justified his actions as being in the name of the ultimate objective of a comprehen-
sive peace. This justification was essential as Asad was restrained by the merits of relative 
autonomy and had staked the legitimacy of his regime on the achievement of his pan-Arab 
goal. Being an omnibalancer, Asad was able to temporarily ignore domestic opinion in his 
foreign policy decision-making; however, in the long run, Asad had to find an equilibrium 
with his foreign policy in order to maintain a degree of ideological legitimacy necessary 
for his regime's survival. 
Chapter four linked the impact of the New World Order and the Gulf crisis to adaptations 
in both Syrian domestic and foreign policy, suggesting that Asad in order to maintain a 
degree of regime legitimacy had to adapt to the new situation and accelerate the transition 
to legal/rational legitimacy. Asad, therefore, by moving towards a market economy and 
taking further steps to establish a more liberal institutionalised state, is gradually shifting 
the basis of his regime's legitimacy away from ideology towards more legal/rational 
legitimacy. This shift is necessary to ensure regime survival, as after a potential peace 
settlement with Israel, ideological legitimacy as the core of Syria's regime legitimacy will 
become less viable. 
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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and especially after the Gulf War, Asad adapted 
his tactics to the new international environment, but has remained consistent in his goal to 
achieve a comprehensive peace with Israel on the basis of UN resolution 242. Before the 
PLO and Jordanian separate deals with Israel, no other policy would have been possible 
without severely straining the legitimacy of the Syrian regime. The development of the 
PLO and Jordanian tracks, has displaced some of Syria's responsibility to the Palestinians. 
Interestingly, it has stimulated Syrian nationalism amongst the public opinion and cleared 
the way for Asad to make a deal with Israel on the Golan without damaging his nationalist 
legitimacy. In view of the changing regional and international environment, however, it 
has become more necessary for Asad to replace the regime's ideological legitimacy with a 
legal/rational legitimacy. 
In conclusion, Asad, between November 1970 and July 1994, has constructed a stable state 
by broadening the support base of the regime and by adapting the ingredients of his 
regime's legitimacy mix according to threats and opportunities both within Syria and in the 
international arena. By carefully balancing internal and external threats, Asad has been 
able to pursue his consistent foreign policy goals with tactical flexibility, whilst ensuring 
his internal legitimacy. 
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